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Medical tourism – the travel of patients from one (the “home”) country to another 
(the “destination”) country for medical treatment – represents a growing business. A 
number of authors have raised the concern that medical tourism reduces access to health 
care for the destination country’s poor and suggested that home country governments or 
international bodies have obligations to curb medical tourism or mitigate its negative 
eff ects when they occur.
   Th is article is the fi rst to comprehensively examine both the question of whether this 
negative eff ect on access to health care occurs for the destination country’s poor, and 
the normative question of the home country and international bodies’ obligations if 
it does occur. I draw on the work of leading theorists from the Statist, Cosmopolitan, 
and Intermediate camps on Global Justice and apply it to medical tourism. I also show 
how the application of these theories to medical tourism highlights areas in which these 
theories are underspecifi ed and suggests diverging paths for fi lling in lacunae. Finally, 
I discuss the kinds of home country, destination country, and multilateral forms of 
regulation this analysis would support and reject.
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I.  Preface
When the editors of the Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law approached me about republishing my article 
Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice to share with a 
Canadian audience, I welcomed the opportunity to add this short preface 
that would allow me to focus on developments since I published the 
original text. 
 Turner, and Mark Wu for comments on earlier drafts. For their 
comments, I also thank participants at the Harvard Law School/Program 
on Ethics and Health Population-Level Bioethics Reading Group on 
January 6, 2011, the International Conference on Ethical Issues in 
Medical Tourism at Simon Fraser University on June 25, 2010, and at 
the Health Law Scholars Workshop of the American Society for Law, 
Medicine & Ethics and the St. Louis University School of Law Center for 
Health Law Studies on September 12, 2009. Excellent research assistance 
was provided by Russell Kornblith, Katherine Kraschel, and Teel Lidow.
 Originally published in the Virginia Journal of International Law: Glenn 
Cohen, “Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice” 
(2011) 52:1 Va J Int’l L 1. Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 
2011 Virginia Journal of International Law Association; I Glenn Cohen.
163(2015) 1 CJCCL
Th e fi rst development is conceptual, and relates to dialogue about 
my work led by excellent colleagues in Canada. I will focus on three.
First, in their thoughtful paper in the Journal of Law, Medicine, and 
Ethics, commenting on my own prior work on this subject, YY Brandon 
Chen and Colleen Flood (of the University of Toronto) suggest that in 
this paper, I have been wrong in the questions that I focus on:
[W]e argue that there is an a priori bias embedded in how Cohen (and 
other commentators) has framed the problématique of medical tourism … 
[In Cohen and other commentators’ writing,] the burden appears to rest on 
opponents of medical tourism to prove its negative consequences on LMICs’ 
[low- and middle-income countries’] health care access before regulatory 
actions may be considered. In contrast, we argue in this paper that the 
evidentiary burden should be reversed. We contend that even when access to 
health care in LMICs is not adversely aff ected by medical tourism, there are 
still equity-related concerns that in and of themselves render medical tourism 
normatively problematic. As we discuss further below, this inequity can (and 
often does) arise, for example, when access to primary and preventive health 
services for the general LMIC populations maintains the inadequate status quo 
while medical tourists from well-resourced developed countries are aff orded 
cutting-edge secondary and tertiary care. If equity is considered a relevant goal 
for health care systems and one accepts our conclusion that medical tourism 
in LMICs will likely have deleterious equity impacts, then the burden should 
be borne by medical tourism’s proponents to demonstrate its benefi ts on 
health care access and to justify why some degree of government regulation is 
inappropriate.1 
Th ough I am not sure I completely agree with their read of my work, 
Flood and Chen usefully press me to be clearer that there are three 
distinct versions of the empirical question that will tie into various 
potential approaches to global justice: (1) Are there disparities in access 
to health care for the general population between destination countries 
in the developing world and home countries in the developed world (call 
this the equity question)?; (2) Do we have evidence that medical tourism 
causes defi cits or worsens inequities, or, at the very least, is it associated 
with defi cits or worsening inequities in access by home country citizens 
to health care (call this the causation question)?; (3) Irrespective of what 
1. YY Brandon Chen & Colleen M Flood, “Medical Tourism’s Impact on 
Health Care Equity and Access in Low-and Middle-Income Countries: 
Making the Case for Regulation” (2013) 41:1 JL Med & Ethics 286 at 
287-88. 
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caused the defi cits, would regulation of medical tourism reduce these 
defi cits or inequities (call this the redressability question)?
Chen and Flood assert that “even when access to health care in LMICs 
is not adversely aff ected by medical tourism, there are still equity-related 
concerns that in and of themselves render medical tourism normatively 
problematic,”2 suggesting a focus on only the equity question. But later, 
they say: “[i]f equity is considered a relevant goal for health care systems 
and one accepts our conclusion that medical tourism in LMICs will 
likely have deleterious equity impacts.”3 Th ose last words suggest that the 
causation question, or at least the redressability question, is what matters 
to them after all.
In any event, Chen and Flood helpfully press me to say what I think 
the empirical evidence, they and others have produced, can and cannot 
do. Th e equity question, as such, is not my concern in this article or 
my larger project. Th e empirical answer to that question is easy: it is 
beyond cavil that there are deep disparities in health care access between 
developed and developing countries, as there are to accessing many 
good things that make a life go well. For those whom the existence of 
such disparity, whatever its cause and whether or not regulating medical 
tourism will ameliorate matters, is enough to motivate an obligation to 
render aid, empirical evidence is largely beside the point. 
By contrast, I am interested in the causation question. To the extent 
medical tourism causes (or at least is associated with) these diminutions 
in health care access and thus worsens inequities, then it is easier to build 
a moral case for intervention.4 And, even if medical tourism does not 
2. Chen & Flood, ibid at 287.
3. Ibid at 288 [emphasis added].
4. What if medical tourism did not worsen the health care for the 
destination country poor, or in fact improved it, but also increased 
disparities since the wealthy benefi tted even more? Th at is, both the 
worse and best off  are made better off , but not equivalently. For true pure 
egalitarians, who believe inequality is bad, that would be a problem, but 
of course that view has some well-accepted problems relating to leveling 
down. For prioritarians, the pertinent question is whether the worse-
off  are made better off , and whether they are made as better-off  as they 
might be compared to other feasible regulatory re-arrangements. I am 
more drawn to the latter view, and so I focus on whether medical tourism 
“causes defi cits” or “fails to improve” the health care of the destination 
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cause the negative eff ects, for some theories of global justice, it may still 
be important that regulations of the industry can redress health inequities. 
Th us, in this article, I review empirical data suggesting that medical 
tourism causes (or is at least associated with) diminutions in health care 
access, as well as data suggesting regulation of the sector might ameliorate 
health inequities. I do not focus on the existence of general health 
inequities that are unconnected to medical tourism. 
Th e second development is just to note that there has been additional 
empirical evidence off ered about some of the negative eff ects of medical 
tourism.5 I discuss some of this new evidence in greater depth in my new 
book Patients With Passports: Medical Tourism, Law, and Ethics.6 Th at said, 
as I suggest in my article, the evidence is still patchy and any assessment 
can only be made country-by-country and indeed practice-by-practice.
Th e third thing I want to add is to emphasize some aspects of the 
Canadian context in the analysis. In Canada we have two separate potential 
pools of medical tourists – those who are traveling out of country with 
the support of the Canadian health care system, and those paying out-
of-pocket to go. Th e latter group is well covered in the original article. 
Th e former group is worth further attention. In accord with the Canada 
Health Act,7 each of the Canadian provincial and territorial health care 
country poor, not on whether it worsens inequality per se. For those who 
are more attracted to purer egalitarian views, much of what I say in this 
chapter can be re-analyzed under that standard.
5. See Chen & Flood, supra note 1; Matthias Helble, “Th e Movements 
of Patients Across Borders: Challenges and Opportunities for Public 
Health” (2011) 89:1 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 68, 
online: World Health Organization <http://www.who.int/bulletin/
volumes/89/1/10-076612/en/>; Jeremy Snyder et al, “Caring for 
Non-Residents in Barbados: Examining the Implications of Inbound 
Transnational Medical Care for Public and Private Health Care” in David 
Boterrill, Guido Pennings & Tomas Mainil, eds, Medical Tourism and 
Transnational Health Care (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 48 
at 51; Jeremy Snyder et al, “Beyond Sun, Sand, and Stitches: Assigning 
Responsibility for the Harms of Medical Tourism” (2013) 27:5 Bioethics 
233 at 234; Zahra Meghani, “A Robust, Particularist Ethical Assessment 
of Medical Tourism” (2011) 11:1 Developing World Bioethics 16 at 28.
6. I Glenn Cohen, Patients With Passports: Medical Tourism, Law, and Ethics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
7. RSC 1985, c C-6.
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plans must reimburse for out-of-country care in emergency situations.8 
Strictly speaking, this is not medical tourism as I defi ned it, but medical 
care coincident with tourism or other travel. However, the Canadian 
provinces also all fund patients who travel abroad for health care and are 
sent there by the provincial health plans.
As Runnels and Packer note:
Depending on the patient’s specifi c situation and the province/territory, some 
or all of the costs of OOCC will be covered under provincial/territorial health 
insurance plans, determined by a process designed to ascertain that the patient 
meets the conditions for OOCC. Th ese criteria for eligibility are generally 
similar in all provinces and territories, and are as follows:
• the treatment or care must be medically required; 
• the medical or hospital service must be demonstrated to be 
unavailable in the province/territory and/or elsewhere in Canada; 
that is, “if all Canadian medical resources have been exhausted”; 
• the delay in the provision of medical care available in the province/
territory or elsewhere in Canada must be considered to be 
immediately life threatening or may result in medically signifi cant 
irreversible tissue damage; 
• the treatment must fall under insured medical, oral surgeries and/
or hospital services; and, 
• the applicant must be a resident of the province/territory.9
Th ere are also some variations between the provinces, for example, 
Manitoba will cover some transportation costs while most of the other 
8. See Vivien Runnels & Corinne Packer, “Travelling for Healthcare from 
Canada: An Overview of Out-of-Country Care Funded by Provincial/
Territorial Health Insurance Plans” in Ronald Labonté et al, eds, Travelling 
Well: Essays in Medical Tourism (2013) 4:1 Transdisciplinary Studies in 
Population Health Series 133 at 135-37, online: University of Ottawa 
<https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/23788/1/Travelling%20
Well-%20Essays%20in%20MedicalTourism.pdf>; Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, Have Health Card, Will Travel: Out-of-Province/-
Territory Patients (Canada: CIHI, 2010) online: Analysis in Brief <https://
secure.cihi.ca/free_products/out_of_province_aib_201003_e.pdf>.  
9. Runnels & Packer, ibid at 136-37, citing Manitoba Health, Out-of-
Province Medical Referrals, online: Province of Manitoba <http://www.
gov.mb.ca/health/mhsip/oop.html>; British Columbia Medical Services 
Commission, Out of Province and Out of Country Medical Care Guidelines 
(Canada: Medical Services Commission, 2011) online: Government 
of British Columbia <http://www.health.gov.bc.ca/msp/infoben/ooc_
funding_guidelines.pdf>.
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provinces do not.10 Each of the provinces has a process for review of 
requests, approval or disapproval, and ultimately appeal. To take the 
example of Ontario:
[A] family physician (general practitioner) must take the fi rst steps towards 
determining need with the patient. Th e family physician initiates the request 
for approval, and is required to refer a patient to a specialist physician or an 
assessment centre within Ontario for assessment. Only after the specialist 
physician has seen the patient and judged that the care needed cannot be 
obtained within the province does the specialist write an application for 
funding for out-of-country health services to the provincial health authority. 
Th e referring physician and a specialist must both complete and sign the 
application form, along with the patient or his/her representative who has 
power of attorney. Th e form must be accompanied by relevant documentation, 
such as clinical reports and lab test results …
Information must be provided on the case and explanations given as to why 
OOCC is needed. Th e Ministry of Health reviews the application, and must 
approve it before treatment is obtained abroad, otherwise costs will not be 
reimbursed. In other words, not only must eligibility be established, but a 
patient must be pre-approved for OOCC by the provincial ministry of health 
if the costs of the healthcare are to be borne by the province. Th is process adds 
to the waiting time as the patient waits to be seen by a specialist who may refer 
the patient to yet another specialist within the province who is either able to 
off er the treatment or surgery or will recommend OOCC.
Health services and treatments which have been approved by out-of-country 
prior approval programs in diff erent provinces and territories have included 
cancer treatment, diagnostic testing, high-risk bariatric surgery, residential 
treatment (such as for psychiatric disorders, eating disorders or substance 
abuse), neurosurgery, spinal surgery, and pregnancy complications.11
When an application is denied, the patient may appeal that denial directly 
to the Ministry or to the province’s Health Services Appeal and Review 
Board, a quasi-independent tribunal that holds public hearings as part of 
its adjudication.12
While this form of reimbursed medical tourism was not designed 
specifi cally to deal with waiting lists in Canadian provinces, it has been 
used for that purpose.13
10. Runnels & Packer, ibid.
11. Ibid at 138.
12. Runnels & Packer, supra note 8 at 139.
13. Ibid at 140.
168 
 
Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice
Th ese facts are relevant for my analysis, as I argue below that home 
countries have particularly strong moral obligations for government-
prompted medical tourism. Especially where, as it appears, Canada 
does not merely passively support its citizens going abroad through 
reimbursing their care, but may also cause their need to go abroad in the 
fi rst place based on funding decisions relating to health care availability 
domestically, its duties may be higher. Th ese duties may entail sending 
Canadian patients only to foreign facilities that have taken steps to 
mitigate and/or ameliorate the negative impacts of medical tourism 
on health care for their domestic poor, paying subsidies to the local 
communities whose interests they may be stymieing.
II.  Introduction
Medical tourism – the travel of patients who are residents of one country 
(the “home country”) to another country for medical treatment (the 
“destination country”) – represents a growing and important business. 
For example, by one estimate, in 2004, more than 150,000 foreigners 
sought medical treatment in India, a number that is projected to increase 
by fi fteen percent annually for the next several years.14 M alaysia saw 
130,000 foreign patients in the same year.15 I n 2005, Bumrungrad 
International Hospital in Bangkok, Th ailand, alone saw 400,000 foreign 
patients, 55,000 of whom were American (although these numbers 
are contested).16 B y off ering surgeries such as hip and heart valve 
replacements at savings of more than eighty percent from that which 
one would pay out-of-pocket in the United States, medical tourism has 
enabled underinsured and uninsured Americans to secure otherwise 
unaff ordable health care.17 Th e title of a recent Senate hearing – “Th e 
14. Glenn Cohen, “Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and 
the Patient-Protective Argument” (2010) 95:5 Iowa L Rev 1467 at 1472 
[Cohen, “Protecting Patients”].
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See e.g. ibid at 1476-88, citing Arnold Milstein & Mark Smith, “Will 
the Surgical World Become Flat?” (2007) 26:1 Health Aff airs 137 at 
137, 139-40; US, Th e Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism 
Reduce Health Care Costs?: Hearing Before the Special Committee on Aging, 
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Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care 
Costs?” – captures the promise of medical tourism.18 U S insurers and 
self-insured businesses have also made attempts to build medical tourism 
into health insurance plans off ered in the United States, and states like 
West Virginia have considered incentivizing their public employees to use 
medical tourism.19 Th ere have even been calls for Medicaid and Medicare 
to incentivize medical tourism for their covered populations.20 
Although hardly new, in recent years, the dramatic increase in the 
scope of the industry and the increasing involvement of US citizens as 
medical tourists to developing countries have made pressing a number 
of legal and ethical issues.21 W hile the growth of medical tourism has 
109th Cong (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Offi  ce, 2006) at 18 (Dr Arnold Milstein), online: US Government 
Information <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg30618/pdf/
CHRG-109shrg30618.pdf> [Th e Globalization of Health Care]; Devon M 
Herrick, “Medical Tourism: Global Competition in Health Care” (2007) 
NCPA Pol’y Rep 304 (November 2007) at 11 table 1, online: National 
Center for Policy Analysis <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st304.pdf >, relying 
on data from Unmesh Kher, “Outsourcing Your Heart”, Time (21 May 
2006) 44.
18. Th e Globalization of Health Care, ibid at 1.
19. See Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1473, citing US, HB 
4359, 77th Leg, 2d Spec Sess, W Va, 2006; Joe Cochrane, “Medical 
Meccas”, Newsweek (30 October 2006) 1; Mark Roth, “Surgery Abroad 
an Option for Th ose with Minimal Health Coverage”, Post Gazette (10 
September 2006) online: Post Gazette <http://www.post-gazette.com/life/
travel/2006/09/10/Surgery-abroad-an-option-for-those-with-minimal-
health-coverage/stories/200609100214>.
20. See Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, ibid at 1473-74; Dean Baker & Hye Jin 
Rho, “Free Trade in Health Care: Th e Gains from Globalized Medicare 
and Medicaid” (2009) online: Center for Economic Policy and Research 
<http:// www.cepr.net/documents/publications/free-trade-hc-2009-09.
pdf>.
21. In some senses, medical tourism is a very old phenomenon. Ancient 
Greeks traveled to spas known as asklepia in the Mediterranean for 
purifi cation and spiritual healing, and for over two thousand years, 
foreign patients have traveled to the Aquae Sulis reservoir built by the 
Romans in what is now the British town of Bath. See Kerrie S Howze, 
“Note, Medical Tourism: Symptom or Cure?” (2007) 41:3 Ga L Rev 
1013 at 1015-16; Anne Cearley & Penni Crabtree, “Alternative-Medicine 
Clinics in Baja Have History of Controversy”, San Diego Union Tribune (1 
February 2006) A8. Moreover, in the United States, our most outstanding 
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represented a boon (although not an unqualifi ed one)22 for US patients, 
what about the interests of those in the destination countries? From their 
perspective, medical tourism presents a host of cruel ironies. Vast medico-
industrial complexes, replete with the newest expensive technologies 
to provide comparatively wealthy medical tourists hip replacements 
and facelifts, coexist with large swaths of the population dying from 
malaria, AIDS, and lack of basic sanitation and clean water. A recent 
New York Times article entitled “Royal Care for Some of India’s Patients, 
Neglect for Others,” for example, begins by describing the care given 
at Wockhardt Hospital in India to “Mr. Steeles, 60, a car dealer from 
Daphne, Ala., [who] had fl own halfway around the world last month to 
save his heart [through a mitral valve repair] at a price he could pay.”23 
Th e article describes in great detail the dietician who selects Mr. Steeles’ 
meals, the dermatologist who comes as soon as he mentions an itch, and 
Mr. Steeles’ “Royal Suite” with “cable TV, a computer, [and] a mini-
refrigerator, where an attendant that afternoon stashed some ice cream, 
for when he felt hungry later.”24 Th is treatment contrasts with the care 
given to a group of “day laborers who laid bricks and mixed cement for 
Bangalore’s construction boom,” many of whom “fell ill after drinking 
illegally brewed whisky; 150 died that day.”25 “Not for them [was] the care 
of India’s best private hospitals,” writes the article’s author; “[t]hey had 
been wheeled in by wives and brothers to the overstretched government-
facilities like the Mayo Clinic have long attracted medical tourists, and 
Middle Eastern patients, for example, have also sought care in other 
developed-world medical hubs, such as London.
22. As I have discussed elsewhere, medical tourism presents concerns 
regarding disparities in quality of care and medical malpractice recovery. 
See generally Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 (reviewing 
the risks of malpractice and care quality created by medical tourism and 
proposing regulations to protect patients). It is also uncertain whether the 
recently enacted health care reform, if fully implemented, will blunt some 
of the motivation to go abroad of US medical tourists currently paying 
out of pocket (since more will be insured), as well as whether it will result 
in more insurer-prompted medical tourism. See Howze, ibid at 1525-26, 
1542-43.
23. Somini Sengupta, “Royal Care for Some of India’s Patients, Neglect for 
Others”, New York Times (1 June 2008) K3.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
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run Bowring Hospital, on the other side of town,” a hospital with “no 
intensive care unit, no ventilators, no dialysis machine,” where “[d]inner 
was a stack of white bread, on which a healthy cockroach crawled.”26 
Th ese kinds of stark disparities have prompted intuitive discomfort 
and critiques in the academic and policy literatures. For example, David 
Benavides, a Senior Economic Aff airs Offi  cer working on trade for the 
United Nations, has noted that developed and developing countries’ 
attempts at exporting health services sometimes come “at the expense of 
the national health system, and the local population has suff ered instead 
of benefi ting from those exports.”27 R upa Chanda, an Indian professor of 
business, writes in the World Health Organization Bulletin that medical 
tourism threatens to “result in a dual market structure, by creating a 
higher-quality, expensive segment that caters to wealthy nationals and 
foreigners, and a much lower-quality, resource-constrained segment 
catering to the poor.”28 W hile the “[a]vailability of services, including 
physicians and other trained personnel, as well as the availability 
of beds may rise in the higher-standard centres,” it may come “at the 
expense of the public sector, resulting in a crowding out of the local 
population.”29 Similarly, Professor Leigh Turner suggests that “the greatest 
risk for inhabitants of destination countries is that increased volume 
26. Ibid.
27. David Diaz Benavides, “Trade Policies and Export of Health Services: A 
Development Perspective” in Nick Drager & Cesar Vieira, eds, Trade in 
Health Services: Global, Regional, and Country Perspectives (Washington, 
DC: Pan American Health Organization Program on Public Policy and 
Health, 2002) 35 at 39, online: World Health Organization <http://www.
who.int/trade/resource/THS/en/>.
28. Rupa Chanda, “Trade in Health Services” in Nick Drager & Cesar Vieira, 
eds, Trade in Health Services: Global, Regional, and Country Perspectives 
(Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization Program on Public 
Policy and Health, 2002) 158 at 160, online: World Health Organization 
<http://www.who.int/trade/resource/THS/en/>.
29. Ibid; see also Milica Z Bookman & Karla K Bookman, Medical Tourism in 
Developing Countries (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007) (“[m]edical 
Tourism can thus create a dual market structure in which one segment is 
of higher quality and caters to the wealthy foreigners (and local high-
income patients) while a lower quality segment caters to the poor ... [such 
that] health for the local population is crowded out as the best doctors, 
machines, beds, and hospitals are lured away from the local poor” at 176).
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of international patients will have adverse eff ects upon local patients, 
health care facilities and economies.”30 He explains that the kinds of 
investments destination-country governments must make to compete are 
in “specialized medical centres and advanced biotechnologies” unlikely 
to be accessed by “most citizens of a country [who] lack access to basic 
health care and social services.”31 Furthermore, higher wages for health 
care professionals resulting from medical tourism may crowd out access 
by the domestic poor.32 Th us, “[i]nstead of contributing to broad social 
and economic development, the provision of care to patients from other 
countries might exacerbate existing inequalities and further polarize the 
richest and poorest members” of the destination country.33 
Th e same point has also been made in several regional discussions: 
Janjaroen and Supakankunti argue that in Th ailand, medical tourism 
threatens to both disrupt the ratio of health personnel to the domestic 
population and “create a two-tier system with the better quality services 
reserved for foreign clients with a higher ability to pay.”34 Similarly, the 
Bookmans claim that in Cuba, “only one-fourth of the beds in CIREN 
(the International Center for Neurological Restoration in Havana) are 
fi lled by Cubans, and ... so-called dollar pharmacies provide a broader 
range of medicines to Westerners who pay in foreign currency.”35 Th ey 
describe a medical system so distorted by the eff ects of medical tourism 
as “medical apartheid, because it makes health care available to foreigners 
that is not available to locals.”36 Numerous authors have made similar 
30. Leigh Turner, “‘First World Health Care at Th ird World Prices’: 
Globalization, Bioethics and Medical Tourism” (2007) 2 Biosocieties 303 
at 320.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid at 321.
34. Watatana S Janjaroen & Siripen Supakankunti, “International Trade 
in Health Services in the Millennium: Th e Case of Th ailand” in Nick 
Drager & Cesar Vieira, eds, Trade in Health Services: Global, Regional, 
and Country Perspectives (Washington, DC: Pan American Health 
Organization Program on Public Policy and Health, 2002) 87 at 98, 
online: World Health Organization <http://www.who.int/trade/resource/
THS/en/>.
35. Bookman & Bookman, supra note 29 at 177.
36. Ibid.
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claims about medical tourism in India.37 Similar concerns have even 
been raised as to medical tourism in developed countries. For example, 
an investigation by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz concluded, “medical 
tourists enjoy conditions Israelis can only dream of, including very short 
waiting times for procedures, the right to choose their own doctor and 
private rooms ... [a]nd these benefi ts may well be coming at the expense 
of Israeli patients’ care.” Th e investigation also suggested that allowing 
medical tourists to move to the front of the line on waiting lists for services 
meant that “waiting times for ordinary Israelis will inevitably lengthen – 
especially in the departments most frequented by medical tourists, which 
include the cancer, cardiac and in vitro fertilization units.”38 
Behind all of these claims – scholarly and popular – are some 
signifi cant and interesting fundamental questions. How likely is medical 
tourism to produce negative consequences on health care access in Less 
Developed Countries?39 If those eff ects occur, does the United States 
(or other Western countries or international bodies) have an obligation 
to discourage or regulate medical tourism to try to prevent such 
37. See e.g. Ami Sen Gupta, “Medical Tourism in India: Winners and Losers” 
(2008) 5:1 Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 4-5; Laura Hopkins et al, 
“Medical Tourism Today: What is the State of Existing Knowledge?” 
(2010) 31:2 Journal of Public Health Policy 185 at 194; Rory Johnston et 
al, “What is Known About the Eff ects of Medical Tourism in Destination 
and Departure Countries? A Scoping Review” (2010) 9:24 International 
Journal for Equity in Health 1.
38. Dan Even & Maya Zinshtein, “Haaretz Probe: Israel Gives Medical 
Tourists Perks Denied to Citizens”, Haaretz (18 November 2010) online: 
Haaretz.com <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haaretz-probe-
israel-gives-medical-tourists-perks-denied-to-citizens-1.325275>.
39. Of course, as a growing literature emphasizes, it is a mistake to fetishize 
health care in normative analysis instead of health, which may depend 
more on sanitation, housing, and social determinants than on medical 
services. See Norman Daniels, Just Health (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 79-102; Michael Marmot et al, “Contributions 
of Psychosocial Factors to Socioeconomic Diff erences in Health” (1998) 
76:3 Milbank Quarterly 403 at 434. Although conscious of this issue, I 
will for the most part focus on health care access because this is the main 
margin in which medical tourism has been predicted to have negative 
eff ects, while acknowledging that it is the negative eff ects on health 
stemming from these diminutions in health care access that motivate the 
concern.
174 
 
Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice
consequences? How might governments do so?
I examine those questions in this article, the fi rst in-depth treatment 
focusing on the normative question of home countries’ obligations.40 In 
so doing, I draw on international development work on health systems 
and globalization, political philosophy work on international justice, 
and a more embryonic applied literature on the normative aspects of 
drug access and pricing in the developing world. While my focus is on 
medical tourism, this article also aims to further fl esh out the intersection 
of health inequalities, trade, and Global Justice obligations.
I hope the analysis developed here will serve as a template for discussion 
of similar problems in the globalization of health care, including medical 
migration (that is, “brain drain”). Indeed, I see this work as a dialogue 
between the theory and its application. On the one hand, political 
theories on Global Justice can help us better understand our obligations 
regarding medical tourism. On the other hand, while our intuitions 
might suggest that some of these theories lead to predictable positions on 
medical tourism, their actual application to the case of medical tourism 
yields surprising results and unforeseen complexities, highlights areas in 
which the theories are underspecifi ed, and suggests diverging paths for 
fi lling in lacunae. Th us, these theories of Global Justice cannot only teach 
us something about the concrete case of medical tourism, but medical 
tourism can also teach us something about these theories as applied to 
globalization.
More specifi cally, I begin in Part III by describing and distinguishing 
medical tourism by individuals purchasing care out-of-pocket from those 
whose use is prompted by insurers and governments. I then distinguish 
concerns about medical tourism’s eff ect on health care access in the 
destination country – the focus of this article – from other concerns with 
40. My focus in this article is on the obligations of home country 
governments and international bodies. Some of what I say may have 
implications for the obligations of two other groups: individual tourist 
patients and corporations involved in (or who incentive their covered 
populations to use) medical tourism, and I noted the instances where 
I see that relevance (e.g. in Nussbaum and Daniels’ work). Translating 
ideas from political philosophy into the realms of moral philosophy or 
corporate social responsibility, however, is no easy task, and I make no 
pretension of fully doing so here.
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medical tourism that I and others have discussed elsewhere. I unpack 
this concern as encompassing an empirical claim and a normative claim, 
which I examine in turn.
I begin with the empirical claim in Part IV, where I show that 
despite the expressions of concern of several prominent scholars and 
policymakers, there currently exists little empirical evidence that suggests 
medical tourism has adverse eff ects on health care access in destination 
countries. Nevertheless, both as a grounding for what follows and as an 
attempt to help formulate an empirical research project, I discuss six 
possible triggering conditions through which we would expect medical 
tourism to reduce access for the poor in destination countries.
In Part V, the heart of the paper, I turn to the normative claim and 
ask: assuming arguendo that medical tourism reduces health care access in 
destination countries for local populations (the empirical claim), under 
what conditions should such a reduction trigger obligations on the part 
of home countries and international bodies to regulate medical tourism 
or mitigate its negative eff ects? I demonstrate why arguments appealing 
to national self-interest in order to restrict medical tourism fail. I then 
examine three broad camps of Global Justice theory (Cosmopolitan, 
Statist, and Intermediate) and analyze whether they can be applied to 
medical tourism as grounds for these obligations.
Part VI examines how much of an overlapping consensus and 
divergence exists between the prescriptions of the theories in these rival 
camps, drawing some distinctions between kinds of medical tourism. I also 
discuss ways in which policymakers can use domestic and international 
law to translate ethical theory into reality.
A conclusion summarizes and charts some implications of my 
analysis for health care globalization more generally.
III. Kinds of Medical Tourism, Kinds of    
 Ethical Concerns
Medical tourism is one part of a larger move toward the globalization of 
health care, a globalization that encompasses, among other things, medical 
migration (the brain drain), medical outsourcing (such as teleradiology), 
research tourism (where US-based pharmaceutical companies perform 
176 
 
Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice
clinical trials abroad), and the parallel trade in approved pharmaceuticals 
(such as purchasing drugs from Canada). At a high level, medical tourism 
falls into three types, each of which raises ethical questions I have outlined 
elsewhere: (1) medical tourism for services that are illegal in both the 
patient’s home and destination countries (such as organ purchase in 
the Philippines); (2) medical tourism for services that are illegal or 
unapproved in the patient’s home country but legal in the destination 
country (such as fertility, euthanasia, experimental drug, and stem cell 
tourism); and (3) medical tourism for services legal in both the home and 
destination countries. 41  
In this article, I focus on the last category. I divide such medical 
tourism by patient population into three types, each relevant for the 
normative analysis that follows. Th e fi rst is patients paying out-of-pocket. 
In the United States, this typically refers to uninsured or underinsured 
patients using medical tourism to achieve substantial cost savings for 
procedures like hip replacements.42 A second group consists of private-
insurer-prompted medical tourism. In its weakest form, insurers simply 
cover the service abroad without any incentive, but in a more common 
form, Tourism-Incentivized plans off er individuals rebates, waived 
deductibles, or other payment incentives for receiving treatment abroad.43 
For example, a plan proposed by Hannaford Brothers Supermarkets in the 
northeastern United States gives employees incentives to seek treatment 
in Singapore at Joint Commission International (JCI)-accredited 
hospitals.44 A fi nal form is government-prompted medical tourism. For 
example, there have been recent proposals to give US Medicare and 
Medicaid patients incentives to use medical tourism (with estimates of 
USD $18 billion in annual savings based on ten percent of the populace 
taking advantage of the incentives). Another version is already in place 
41. I Glenn Cohen, “Medical Tourism: Th e View from Ten Th ousand Feet” 
(2010) Hastings Center Report 11 at 11-12 [Cohen, “Medical Tourism”].
42. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1479-81.
43. Ibid at 1486-88, (discussing Tourism-Incentivized, Tourism-Mandatory, 
and Domestic-Extra possible confi gurations).
44. Ibid at 1486, citing Bruce Einhorn, “Hannaford’s Medical-Tourism 
Experiment”, Businessweek (9 November 2008) online: Businessweek 
<http://www.businessweek.com>.
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in the European Union, where member states face some obligations to 
reimburse their citizens for treatments received in other member states.45 
Medical tourism of any of these types raises a large number of ethical 
and legal concerns – concerns about protecting the tourist patient from 
poor quality of care; the de facto waiver of rights to medical malpractice 
compensation for any resulting medical error; the dynamic eff ects on 
health care provided at home (including the possibility of regulatory 
races to the bottom); and the structuring of fair health insurance plans. 46 
In this article, I focus on a very diff erent set of concerns: those pertaining 
to potential negative eff ects of medical tourism on health care access for 
the poor in the destination country.
IV.  Th e Empirical Claim
While concerns about eff ects on health care access abroad are raised 
by academics and policymakers discussing medical tourism, they have 
thus far been under-theorized. Th ese concerns are best thought of as 
consisting of an empirical claim – that medical tourism diminishes health 
care access in the destination country, usually with a focus on its eff ects 
on the poorest residents – and a normative one – that such diminished 
access creates obligations on the United States and other tourist patient 
home countries (or international bodies, or possibly corporations) to do 
something about medical tourism. 47
45. See ibid at 1488, citing Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, C-372/04 
[2006] ECR I-04325; Nicolas P Terry, “Under-Regulated Health Care 
Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing” (2007) 
29:2 W New Eng L Rev 421 at 437. In 2011, the EU adopted a new 
directive on cross-border health care codifying some of this case law and 
altering and adding other elements. See e.g. Sophie Petjean, “Council 
Approves Compromise with Parliament”, Europolitics (10 February 2011) 
online: Europolitics <http://europolitics.info/>.
46. See generally Cohen, “Medical Tourism”, supra note 41 discussing these 
issues; Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 discussing similar 
issues; Nathan Cortez, “Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border 
Health Care” (2010) 10:1 Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 
1.
47. Th is should be contrasted with a diff erent claim that although medical 
tourism does not harm the interests of people in the destination country, 
in the sense that these individuals are just as or more well-off , all things 
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Although, as discussed, there have been a number of more anecdotal 
statements and analyses off ered in favor of the empirical claim, there 
is very little in the way of statistical evidence supporting the empirical 
claim. As such, this is an area where more developmental economic work 
would be very helpful. Th at said, I think it useful to identify six triggering 
conditions, which, when combined with substantial amounts of medical 
tourism, may lead to reduced access to health care for local populations 
and thus satisfy the empirical claim:
(1) Th e health care services consumed by medical tourists come 
from those that would otherwise have been available to the destination 
country poor. When medical tourists seek travel abroad for cardiac care, 
hip replacements, and other forms of surgery used by the destination 
country poor, the siphoning eff ect is straightforward. By contrast, the 
destination country poor are already unlikely to be able to access some 
boutique forms of treatment, such as cosmetic surgery and stem cell and 
fertility therapies. Th us, while medical tourism by American patients for 
these services would diminish access by, for example, Indian patients, it 
would not necessarily diminish access for poor Indian patients (which 
would remain steady at virtually none). Instead, it would cut into access 
by upper-class patients. Th us, one triggering condition focuses on 
whether medical tourism is for services currently accessed by destination 
country poor. Th at said, as discussed below, over time, the salience of the 
distinction is likely to break down, and even medical tourism for services 
currently inaccessible to destination country poor may siphon resources 
away from the poor because increased demand for services like cosmetic 
surgery may redirect the professional choices of graduating or practicing 
physicians who currently provide health care to India’s poor into these 
niche markets. Whether that dynamic obtains would depend in part on 
the extent to which the destination country regulates specialty choice 
being considered, it could be designed in a way that could make them 
even better off  or have fewer negative eff ects along with its positive ones. 
C.f. Seana Valentine Shiff rin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, 
and the Signifi cance of Harm” (1999) 5:1 Legal Th eory 117 (proposing 
a non-comparative model where “harm” and “benefi t” are two separate 
things, and it is wrong to impose harm without consent in order to confer 
an even larger benefi t).
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versus the extent to which health care workers can pursue the specialties 
most desirable to them.
(2) Health care providers are “captured” by the medical tourist 
patient population, rather than serving some tourist clientele and some 
of the existing population. Absent regulation, the introduction of a 
higher-paying market will likely cause health care providers to shift away 
from treating patients in the lower-paying market.48 Th us, for example, 
Hopkins and her co-authors argue that this dynamic has taken place in 
Th ailand, where “[a]lmost 6000 positions for medical practitioners in 
Th ailand’s public system remained unfi lled in 2005, as an increasing 
number of physicians followed the higher wages and more attractive 
settings available in private care,” and that due to medical tourism, “the 
addition of internal ‘brain drain’ from public to private health care may be 
especially damaging” for “countries such as Ghana, Pakistan, and South 
Africa, which lose approximately half of their medical graduates every 
year to external migration.” 49 Th is has also been the dynamic when private 
options are introduced into public systems, even in the developed world, 
although a number of jurisdictions, such as Canada and France, have 
tried by regulation to prevent fl ight to the private system.50 Regulations 
that require providers to spend time in both systems are also more likely 
to produce positive externalities from the private to public health care 
48. See Johnston et al, supra note 37 at 11.
49. Hopkins et al, supra note 37 at 194; see also Rupa Chinai & Rahul 
Goswami, “Medical Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism” 
(2007) 85:3 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 164 (quoting 
Dr. Manuel Dayrit, Director, WHO’s Human Resources for Health 
Department, as saying, “[a]lthough there are no ready fi gures that can 
be cited from studies, initial observations suggest that medical tourism 
dampens external migration but worsens internal migration” at 165).
50. See Colleen M Flood, “Chaoulli’s Legacy for the Future of Canadian 
Health Care Policy” (2006) 44:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 273 (discussing 
evidence that “to the extent that prices are higher in the private sector 
and where specialists are free to do so, they will devote an increasing 
proportion of their time to private patients who are likely to have less 
acute or serious needs than those patients left behind in the public 
system” at 289); Colleen M Flood & Amanda Haugan, “Is Canada 
Odd? A Comparison of European and Canadian Approaches to Choice 
and Regulation of the Public/Private Divide in Health Care” (2005) 5:3 
Health Economics, Policy and Law 319 at 320.
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systems; for example, a physician who receives extra training as part of 
her duties in the medical tourism sector may be able to carry that training 
over to her time spent treating poor patients, if regulation forces her 
facility to treat poor patients. I discuss such possible regulation more in 
depth in Part VI, but it is worth noting that in medical tourism havens 
like India, even when such regulations are in place, many observers have 
been skeptical that they have been or will be enforced. 51
(3) Th e supply of health care professionals, facilities, and technologies 
in the destination country is inelastic. Th eoretically, if medical tourism 
causes increased demand for health care providers and facilities in the 
destination country, the country could meet such demand by increasing 
the supply of these things. In reality, however, even Western nations have 
had diffi  culty increasing this supply when necessary.52 As discussed, the 
need to match increased demand for the right specialties poses additional 
problems. In any event, investments in building capacity always entail an 
adjustment period. Th us, even countries that are unusually successful in 
increasing the size of their health care workforce to meet the demands of 
medical tourism will face interim shortages.
(4) Th e positive eff ects of medical tourism in counteracting the brain 
drain of health care practitioners to foreign countries are outweighed by 
the negative eff ects of medical tourism on the availability of health care 
resources. Medical migration, or brain drain, represents a signifi cant threat 
51. See e.g. Gupta, supra note 37 (“[t]he government would have us believe 
that revenues earned by the industry will strengthen health care in the 
country. But we do not see any mechanism by which this can happen. 
On the contrary, corporate hospitals have repeatedly dishonoured the 
conditions for receiving government subsidies by refusing to treat poor 
patients free of cost – and they have got away without punishment. 
Moreover, reserving a few beds for the poor in elite institutions does not 
address the necessity to increase public investment in health to three to 
fi ve times the present level” at 4-5); Johnston et al, supra note 37 at 5.
52. See Greg L Stoddart & Morris L Barer, “Will Increasing Medical School 
Enrollment Solve Canada’s Physician Supply Problems?” (1999) 161:8 
Canadian Medical Associaton Journal 983; Abhaya Kamalakanthan 
& Sukhan Jackson, “Th e Supply of Doctors in Australia: Is Th ere a 
Shortage?” University of Queensland, Discussion Paper No. 341 (2006) 
online: University of Queensland <http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.
php?pid=UQ:8209&dsID=econ_dp_341_0506.pdf>.
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to health care access abroad. For example, 61 percent of all graduates 
from the Ghana Medical School between 1986 and 1995 left Ghana 
for employment elsewhere (of those, 54.9 percent worked in the United 
Kingdom and 35.4 percent worked in the United States), and a 2005 
study found that 25 percent of doctors in the United States are graduates 
of foreign medical schools.53 A recent study of nurses in fi ve countries 
found that 41 percent reported dissatisfaction with their jobs and one-
third of those under age thirty planned on leaving to work elsewhere.54 As 
Larry Gostin has put it, in the ordinary course of globalization, “[h]ealth 
care workers are ‘pushed’ from developing countries by the impoverished 
conditions: low remuneration, lack of equipment and drugs, and poor 
infrastructure and management,” and “[t]hey are ‘pulled’ to developed 
countries by the allure of a brighter future: better wages, working 
conditions, training, and career opportunities, as well as safer and more 
stable social and political environments.”55 It is possible that for health care 
professionals tempted to leave their country of origin to practice in other 
markets, the availability of higher-paying jobs with better technology and 
more time with patients in the medical tourist sector of their country of 
origin will counteract this incentive. 56 Medical tourism may also enable 
the destination country to “recapture” some health care providers who left 
53. Fitzhugh Mullan, “Th e Metrics of Th e Physician Brain Drain” (2005) 
353:17 New Eng Journal of Medicine 1810 at 1811; David Sanders et 
al, “Public Health in Africa” in Robert Beaglehole, ed, Global Public 
Health: A New Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 172. Th e 
cost to less developed countries and the benefi t to the United States and 
other countries caused by the brain drain are staggering. A recent report 
suggested that it would have cost on average USD $184,000 to treat each 
of the three million health care professionals who had migrated, such that 
richer nations saved $552 billion, whereas poor nations lost $500 million 
in training costs. Bookman & Bookman, supra note 29 at 106.
54. Linda H Aiken et al, “Nurses’ Reports on Hospital Care in Five 
Countries” (2001) 20:3 Health Aff airs 43 at 45-46.
55. Lawrence O Gostin, “Th e International Migration and Recruitment of 
Nurses: Human Rights and Global Justice” (2008) 299:15 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 1827 at 1828.
56. See Matthias Helble, “Th e Movements of Patients Across Borders: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Public Health” (2011) 89:1 Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization 68 at 70 (discussing as-yet-unpublished 
data supporting this claim in Th ailand).
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years earlier, or to change brain drain into “brain circulation,” wherein 
home country providers leave for training abroad and return home ready 
to use and impart their skills to other providers in the home country.57 
But while some countries that experience medical brain drain are also 
developing strong medical tourism industries, many are only sources of 
medical brain drain and not destinations for medical tourism.58 Th us, the 
creation of medical tourism hubs may actually exacerbate intra-regional 
medical migration.
(5) Medical tourism prompts destination country governments to 
redirect resources away from basic health care services in a way that 
outweighs positive health care spillovers. In order to compete for patients 
on quality and price against both the patient’s home country and other 
medical tourism hubs, destination countries will need to invest in their 
nascent medical tourism industry through, for example, direct funding, 
tax subsidies, and land grants.59 Unfortunately, such funding often comes 
from money devoted to other health programs, including basic health care 
and social services,60 and those eff ects are likely to be felt most strongly 
by the destination country poor. In other words, we need some sense 
of whether governments actually invest in health care services accessible 
by the poor (or at least do not take them away) in a counterfactual 
world where medical tourism is restricted. We also need to examine this 
dynamic as against a potential countervailing dynamic wherein medical 
tourism leads to a diff usion of Western medical technology or standards 
of practice or other health care spillovers that are benefi cial to the entire 
57. For discussions of these possibilities in other contexts, see e.g. Ayelet 
Shachar, “Th e Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive 
Immigration Regimes” (2006) 81:1 NYUL Rev 148 at 168.
58. Bookman & Bookman, supra note 29 at 105-09.
59. Ibid at 65-82; Turner, supra note 30 at 314-15, 320.
60. See Benavides, supra note 27 at 55; Johnston et al, supra note 37 (“the 
hiring of physicians trained in public education systems by private 
medical tourism facilities is another example of a potentially inequitable 
use of public resources. Furthermore, physicians in [low and middle 
income countries] who might normally practice in resource-poor 
environments can instead treat high-paying international patients, thereby 
gaining access to advanced technologies and superior facilities while 
receiving a higher wage” at 5-6); Turner, supra note 30 at 320.
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patient population. 61 Which dynamic wins out can only be answered on a 
country-by-country basis, but in India, for example, some commentators 
have suggested that the product of these countervailing forces has 
ultimately been a net negative for the destination country poor.62  
(6) Profi ts from the medical tourism industry are unlikely to “trickle 
down.” Successful medical tourism industries promise an infusion of 
wealth into the destination country, and the possibility that all boats will 
rise.63 In practice, however, that possibility may not be realized. Th e reason 
for this might be something insidious like rampant corruption, or it may 
be something more benign, such as a tax system that is not particularly 
redistributive, or a largely foreign-owned medical sector.64 Th us, the fact 
that a destination country gains economically from medical tourism (for 
example, in GDP terms) does not necessarily mean that those gains are 
shared in a way that promotes health care access (or health) among the 
destination poor.
Notice, as it will become relevant in the normative analysis, that 
many of these triggering conditions are themselves in the control of the 
destination country government to some extent.
 As I have said before, data on the eff ects of medical tourism on 
health care access in the destination country are scarce – in many cases, 
they rest on anecdote and speculation – and the analysis can only be done 
on a country-by-country basis, which is impossible, given the current 
paucity of data. In countries where the triggering conditions all obtain, 
one would expect medical tourism to cause some diminution in access to 
61. Nathan Cortez, “International Health Care Convergence: Th e Benefi ts 
and Burdens of Market-Driven Standardization” (2009) 26:3 Wis Int’l LJ 
646.
62. See e.g. Hopkins et al, supra note 37 (“[i]n India, medical professionals 
are trained in highly subsidized public facilities. Th e annual value of these 
public training subsidies to the private sector where many physicians 
eventually work is estimated at more than USD $100 million, at least 
some of which accrues to the medical tourism industry. Th is diverts public 
funds that might otherwise have gone into improving public health care 
for the poor – to private care for more affl  uent individuals” at 194).
63. Cortez, supra note 61 at 693-94, citing Alain Enthoven, “On the Ideal 
Market Structure for Th ird-Party Purchasing of Health Care” (1994) 
39:10 Social Science & Medicine 1413 at 1420.
64. Helble, supra note 56 at 70.
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health care for the destination country’s poorest due to medical tourism; 
as fewer factors obtain, this becomes less likely. Th is list of factors is 
certainly not exhaustive, and there may be additional factors in particular 
countries that push in the other direction. While I cannot prove that 
this result obtains in any country, and some readers will no doubt be 
skeptical, the claim seems at least plausible enough to merit a normative 
analysis.
In the following analysis, I will merely assume we have a home-
destination country pairing where the empirical claim obtains. For 
purposes of illustration, I will use US medical tourists traveling to India 
as my example.65 From this point on, my analysis thus adopts a sort 
of disciplinary division of labour: I leave to development economists 
attempts to corroborate and further specify these triggering conditions 
and to show where they are satisfi ed. I instead focus on the normative 
questions about the obligations that fl ow from potential diminutions, 
and the legal and institutional design questions about how to satisfy 
those obligations.
V.  Th e Normative Question
Suppose that US medical tourism to India really does reduce health 
care access for India’s poorest residents. Does the United States (or an 
international body) have an obligation to do something about it? For 
example, does it have an obligation to try to curb medical tourism use 
by US citizens? In this section, I try to determine how much of an 
overlapping consensus there is among several rival comprehensive moral 
theories.
 In terms of priors, I think it useful to begin with some skepticism 
toward the claim that there is something morally wrong with medical 
tourism because of its negative eff ects on health care access by the 
destination country poor. After all, medical tourism appears to involve 
willing providers of services (destination country physicians and facilities) 
65. While I focus on US medical tourists, much of what I say can be 
transposed to medical tourists from other countries; the exceptions relate 
to some elements of US health insurance and the regulatory tools available 
to deal with US insurer-prompted medical tourism.
185(2015) 1 CJCCL
and willing consumers (home country patients, insurers, governments) 
pursuing an ordinarily morally unproblematic activity (providing medical 
services). Moreover, unlike cases such as organ sale or clinical trials in 
sub-Saharan Africa of drugs that will not be readily available there when 
approved,66  there is no plausible claim that the (in one sense) “voluntary” 
seller (or buyer) is being exploited. Instead, the harm occurs from the 
negative externalities of reduced access to care for third parties produced 
from these voluntarily nonexploitive transactions. I examine four types 
of theories that nonetheless purport to fi nd fault with this arrangement.
A.  Self-Interest
In making the case for curbing medical tourism to policymakers, it would 
be most desirable to appeal to national self-interest directly and claim that 
restrictions on medical tourism would serve the interests of US citizens 
(or the home country of other tourists, but from this point forward I will 
merely say “US” for simplicity). Such an argument would not require 
subscription to any theory of global justice, nor even a particularly 
strong commitment to distributive justice domestically. While many 
philosophers might chafe at the invocation of such an egoistic theory,67 
this argumentative strategy has been employed in parallel settings: 
to urge, among other things, action by developed countries to reduce 
medical migration from developing countries (especially “poaching” 
practices) and the loosening of intellectual property rights to vaccines in 
the developing world, in attempts to increase access to essential medicines 
at price points within the grasp of developing world populations. 68 Might 
66. See e.g. Jennifer S Hawkins, “Research Ethics, Developing Countries, and 
Exploitation: A Primer” in Jennifer S Hawkins & Ezekiel J Emmanuel, 
eds, Exploitation and Developing Countries: Th e Ethics of Clinical Research 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) 21 at 21-55.
67. Th at this kind of argument may not appeal to most Global Justice 
theorists does not mean they should not consider it in attempting to 
persuade policy-makers. As I stress repeatedly in this article, to achieve 
that goal, it is desirable to achieve as much of an overlapping consensus as 
possible between rival views.
68. See William W Fisher & Talha Syed, “Global Justice in Health: 
Developing Drugs for the Developing World” (2007) 40:3 UC Davis L 
Rev 581 at 588-91; Lawrence O Gostin, “Meeting Basic Survival Needs 
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the same kinds of arguments have purchase in this context?
I can think of at least four types of arguments along these lines.
First, one might press patient-protective concerns or concerns about 
externalities borne by our domestic health care system when medical 
tourist patients experience poor care abroad and need additional health 
care here in the United States. For example, because the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act 69 requires that US hospitals provide 
emergency services regardless of patients’ insurance status or ability to 
pay, US hospitals will face the costs associated with meeting additional 
emergency health care needs due to medical tourism that harms US 
patients, and will pass these costs on to other paying patients.70 Even 
assuming these are valid concerns regarding medical tourism (a matter 
itself subject to doubt),71 the larger problem is that the cases where this 
particular self-interest argument might push us to curb medical tourism 
will map on only by coincidence, if at all, to cases posing concerns 
about the destination country poor’s health care access. Th at is, there 
can be cases where this particular self-interest concern would urge action 
but there are no health care access concerns, and cases where there are 
health care access concerns but this particular self-interest argument is 
not operative. Th e same response applies regarding concerns about the 
importation of diseases (especially antibiotic-resistant strains or “super-
bugs”) back to developed countries due to medical tourism, as has been 
of the World’s Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on 
Global Health” (2008) 96 Geo LJ 331 at 352-63.
69. 42 USC §§1395dd(a)-(d) (2010) [EMTALA].
70. Ibid. To put the point another way, some health care may be iatrogenic. 
Th at is, it may cause harm and thus present new health care needs that 
did not exist before the care was provided.
71. See Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1523-42 (discussing 
patient protection). To unpack this point, even if some medical tourism is 
iatrogenic, it seems possible (indeed, even plausible) that on net, medical 
tourism saves hospitals in terms of EMTALA costs; that is, the number 
of patients with new medical needs covered by EMTALA and caused by 
medical tourism may be dwarfed by the number of patients who now 
avoid the need for care covered by EMTALA, because they instead get 
care through medical tourism, preventing or forestalling the need for an 
emergency admission. Th is is, of course, an empirical question, and one 
that would be quite diffi  cult to defi nitively answer, but it seems plausible 
to me that this is the case.
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reported in a few case studies. 72
One might instead adapt to medical tourism other arguments made 
in the health care literature for the claim that the United States (or other 
countries) should care about the impact of US policies or US citizens’ 
behavior on the health of those abroad. First, given the frequency of travel 
by Americans (and others who visit the United States) to India, medical 
tourism that results in decreased access to treatment for infectious diseases 
might increase the risk of transmission of those diseases to Americans.73 
Second, because Indians are valuable to the United States as producer-
exporters of cheap goods and consumer-importers of our goods, 
improving Indian citizens’ basic health care will improve that country’s 
development and ensure more productive trading partners and affl  uent 
markets in which to sell US-made goods.74 Finally, one might make the 
more attenuated argument that improving health care access abroad may 
reduce immigration pressures to the United States or increase national 
security by reducing global terrorism.75  
Unfortunately, these arguments are not very persuasive in this 
context. For the infection-transmission and consumer arguments, we 
should arguably be more concerned about the health of the higher-Socio-
Economic-Status strata of Indian society, who are more likely to travel to 
our shores and be better able to buy our goods. While diminishing health 
care access to India’s poorest, medical tourism services may actually 
improve the health care of the wealthier strata, at least those who are 
able to buy into these better facilities or take advantage of the diff usion 
of knowledge and technology. Th is is not to say there are no infection 
72. See E Yoko Furuya et al, “Outbreak of Mxobacterium Absessus Wound 
Infections Among ‘Lipotourists’ from the United States Who Underwent 
Abdominoplasty in the Dominican Republic” (2008) 46:8 Clinical 
Infectious Diseases 1181; Centre for Disease Control, “Brief Report: 
Nontuberculous Mycobacterial Infections After Cosmetic Surgery – Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic, 2003-2004” (2004) 53:23 Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report 509.
73. C.f. Fisher & Syed, supra note 68 at 588; Gostin, supra note 68 at 353-55.
74. Ibid.
75. C.f. Fisher & Syed, ibid at 590; Gostin, ibid at 358-61. To be clear, Fisher, 
Syed, and Gostin are also not particularly impressed by these arguments, 
even in the health care globalization contexts about which they write.
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concerns – Americans traveling to India for pleasure tourism may bring 
diseases back with them – but that they are less salient than in other 
contexts.
 A more serious and general objection to deploying these self-interest 
arguments here is that even if it is in the American self-interest to help 
India’s poor access health care for these reasons, it will frequently be even 
more in its self-interest to help its own poor citizens in this regard. As I 
have discussed here and elsewhere, and as the Senate recognized in its 
own hearing, medical tourism promises to improve the health care of 
poor Americans even while it (by hypothesis) reduces health care access 
to poor Indians, and the former eff ect might be thought to dominate 
in terms of US self-interest.76 Th is objection is particularly salient for 
medical tourism by those paying out-of-pocket or for government-
prompted medical tourism. It is less forceful an objection with respect 
to insurer-prompted medical tourism, because if medical tourism were 
restricted, many of the users would continue to have access to health care; 
they would just pay more for it. Th at said, at the margins, there may be 
populations whose access to health care will depend on the availability 
of lower-priced health insurance plans with some amount of medical 
tourism covered or incentivized, and particular services may be excluded 
from insurance coverage at a given price if medical tourism is curbed.77 
For similar reasons (discussed more fully below), this objection to the self-
interest argument may be less forceful for certain sub-types of medical 
tourism, like cosmetic surgery. I return to these two distinctions (as to 
insurer-prompted medical tourism and certain sub-types of procedures) 
repeatedly in this paper.
In sum, for most types of medical tourism, we need to go beyond 
76. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1523-28; Cohen, “Medical 
Tourism”, supra note 41 at 11-12.
77. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, ibid at 1546. Th at said, if these insured 
patients are paying more for their health insurance because medical 
tourism is excluded, their welfare will be negatively impacted (they are 
losing disposable income they could spend on other items) even if their 
access to health insurance and therefore health care is less likely to be 
negatively impacted. Whether that distinction matters may depend on 
whether one adopts the view that health has special moral importance (a 
separate spheres kind of view) or not. See Daniels, supra note 39 at 29-78.
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pure national self-interest to mount a cogent defense for why one should 
be concerned about medical tourism’s negative eff ects on health care 
access in the destination country.78 I consider three families of political 
philosophy theories that seek to do that: Cosmopolitan, Statist, and 
Intermediate.
B.  Cosmopolitan Th eories
Cosmopolitan theories share a commitment to ignoring geographic 
boundaries in the application of moral theory. I consider what three 
cosmopolitan theory types – Utilitarian, Prioritarian, and the Nussbaum/
Sen Functioning/Capabilities approach (which is in some senses 
Suffi  cientarian) – would say about medical tourism. Th is discussion 
should be understood as being at the level of ideal types, because there 
are many variants of these theories.
Utilitarians are committed to maximizing aggregated social welfare. 
Cosmopolitan Utilitarians take the Millian and Benthamite slogan “each 
to count for one, and none for more than one,”79 and ignore national 
boundaries in determining who is the “each” to be counted. 80 Bracketing 
complicated questions about what it is that welfare consists of,81 there 
78. John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism” (1863) reprinted in Alan Ryan, ed, 
Utilitarianism And Other Essays (New York: Penguin Books, 1987) 272 at 
336.
79. Th is discussion has been premised on the current volume of medical 
tourism or a volume one might estimate as realistic in the next decade. 
If, for example, a third of the American populace started using medical 
tourism, that eff ect on lost revenue for the US domestic health care 
system and the dynamic eff ects on the US health care market would pose 
a quite separate set of self-interest concerns. I do not investigate those 
hypothetical concerns here, both because the volume of medical tourism 
needed to make them relevant seems extremely unrealistic and because, as 
with the EMTALA cost-related concerns discussed above, the concern is 
quite orthogonal to diminutions in health care access by the destination 
country poor.
80. See Peter Singer, “Famine, Affl  uence, and Morality” (1972) 1:1 
Philosophy & Public Aff airs 229 at 231; Peter Singer, “Th e Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, A Response to Martha Nussbaum” (13 
November 2002) Utilitarianism, online: Utilitarian Philosophers <http://
www.utilitarianism.net/singer/by/20021113.htm>.
81. See generally LW Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (New York: 
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is a prima facie case that Cosmopolitan Utilitarians would fi nd medical 
tourism normatively problematic. As William W Fisher and Talha 
Syed have suggested in the context of pharmaceutical R&D spending 
on diseases that predominantly aff ect the poorest countries, the fact of 
diminishing marginal utility from health care gives a good prima facie 
argument on Utilitarian grounds to favor interventions for the worst-off  
over the better-off , even if each group is a similarly sized population. 
Increasing health care access is more likely to raise the welfare of the 
poor than it is that of comparably richer individuals.82 Th is is true even 
if we grant the possibility that individual utility curves vary and we lack 
suffi  cient knowledge for interpersonal comparisons of utility; as long 
as one makes the minimal assumption that individual utility curves are 
distributed randomly, moving to a more equal distribution will maximize 
utility as a statistical matter because there is an equal chance that a person 
with a given curve will lose or gain the good from the equalizing transfer. 
In other words, “the harm of a loss (to a well-off  person with that utility 
function) will be outweighed by the benefi t (to a worse-off  person with 
that curve).”83 A similar case can be made for interventions to curb 
medical tourism – for example, to invoke one of the possible triggering 
conditions discussed above, if medical tourism causes fewer physicians to 
treat the poor and produces higher infant mortality.
Th is case is only a prima facie one, and more complicated than 
the R&D spending case for several reasons. First, many Cosmopolitan 
Utilitarians are concerned with welfare, not health per se, so increases 
in wealth (and thus welfare) to all the Indian populace from medical 
tourism, even if accompanied by decreases to the health of the poorest, 
have to be factored in, as do wealth increases to Americans based on 
savings from medical tourism, which might muddy the waters.84 Th at 
said, if the wealth gains are also concentrated in the most well-off , the 
Clarendon Press Oxford University Press, 1996) (exploring rival 
defi nitions).
82. Fisher & Syed, supra note 68 at 602-05.
83. Ibid at 605.
84. I say “many Cosmopolitan Utilitarians” because there could also be 
utilitarian views that attached a special importance to health, to which 
this particular objection might not apply.
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same diminishing marginal utility principle will tend to reduce the value 
of these gains. Second, out-of-pocket or government-prompted medical 
tourism usually improves health care access for poor Americans 85 and 
for middle-class Indians who can use these facilities. Th us, in fact, the 
relevant trade-off  is not rich American versus poor Indian, but poor 
American and middle-class Indian versus poor Indian. If the utility 
curves of the poor American and poor Indian are close enough in terms 
of diminishing marginal utility,86 the addition of benefi ts to middle-class 
Indians may make up the weight. For reasons similar to those discussed 
above, this will be less of a problem with curbs on insurer-prompted 
medical tourism. Th ird, the discussion so far has assumed we are trading 
off  one (stylized and hypothetical) increment of health care between the 
domestic citizen and the medical tourist, but there is no reason to think 
the world will actually be so neat. It could be true that in a world with 
medical tourism the Indian patient loses on net only one increment of 
85. As I have noted elsewhere, we lack specifi c demographic information on 
medical tourists, but the existing evidence suggests that in the US they 
are largely uninsured and underinsured patients who lack better options 
for getting necessary health care. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 
14 at 1480. In part because of the funding of and strict eligibility criteria 
for Medicaid in the United States, many of the uninsured who are not 
Medicaid recipients are themselves quite poor. A 2010 Kaiser Family 
Foundation Report estimated that 40 percent of uninsured individuals 
(i.e. not receiving either Medicaid or private insurance) fell below the 
US poverty level, which was USD $22,050 for a family of four in 2010, 
and 90 percent of all uninsured in America were below 400 percent of 
the poverty level. Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, “Th e Uninsured: 
A Primer - Key Facts About Americans Without Health Insurance” 
(Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010) at 5.
86. Th at is, of course, a big “if.” To many, it may seem plausible that even 
a poor American who would make use of medical tourism is quite far 
away from the poor Indian in terms of diminishing marginal utility. 
Th at said, as I have discussed elsewhere in greater depth, see Cohen, 
“Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1472-74, 1479-81, many of the 
current developed-world users of medical tourism are seeking heart bypass 
surgeries, heart valve replacement surgeries, spinal surgeries, and cancer 
treatments they cannot aff ord to have at home. Th ese are serious – in 
many cases, life-or-death – surgeries, and the inability to access them will 
have very large utility consequences. Th us, we ought to be careful before 
too quickly dismissing this issue, even if one’s prior intuitions go the other 
way.
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health care while the American tourist gains three – for example, medical 
tourism might have off setting benefi ts in terms of improving medical 
technology and practice by Indian physicians who serve the domestic 
population. In such a world, while medical tourism makes Indians worse 
off , it does so less than it makes Americans better off . Of course, the 
opposite could be true, in which case the argument for banning medical 
tourism is stronger. None of this is to argue that the Cosmopolitan 
Utilitarian could not oppose medical tourism, but just that there are 
some indeterminacies here.
Many of those indeterminacies become less pressing under 
Cosmopolitan Prioritarianism. Unlike Utilitarians, Prioritarians do “not 
give equal weight to equal benefi ts, whoever receives them,” but instead 
give more weight to “[b]enefi ts to the worse off .”87 Take, for example, 
John Rawls’s extremely Prioritarian Diff erence Principle: inequalities in 
“primary goods” (income, wealth, positions of authority or responsibility, 
the social bases of self-respect, and, after prompting from Norman 
Daniels, health) should be allowed to persist only if they work to the 
greatest benefi t of the least-advantaged group. 88
While, as we will see shortly, Rawls cabined the principle’s application 
to within the nation-state, Charles Beitz, among others, has extended it 
to the international sphere. Beitz identifi es two attractions in doing so: 
(1) the desire to avoid moral arbitrariness in the distribution of primary 
goods – that is, “we should not view national boundaries as having 
fundamental moral signifi cance” 89 – and (2) that a limitation of Rawlsian 
redistribution to the domestic sphere is only justifi able on an account 
of nations as self-suffi  cient cooperative schemes, a position he views as 
untenable in today’s world of international interdependence, where those 
regulating trade (World Trade Organization) and capital (International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank) “[impose] burdens on poor and 
87. Derek Parfi t, “Equality or Priority?” (1997) 10:3 Ratio 202 at 213.
88. See John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1971) § 46 at 300-01, § 11 at 60-61 [Rawls, “Th eory”]; John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2001) § 51.5 at 172; Daniels, supra note 39 at 44.
89. Charles R Beitz, Political Th eory and International Relations (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979) at 151.
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economically weak countries that they cannot practically avoid.”90 
Beitz off ers a strong and weak version of his Cosmopolitan 
Prioritarian thesis. Th e strong version is that we should apply the Rawlsian 
redistributive principle internationally.91  Th is version clearly grounds a 
90. Charles R Beitz, “Justice and International Relations” (1975) 4:4 
Philosophy & Public Aff airs 360 at 374.
91. Rawls is careful in A Th eory of Justice to limit the ambit of his Diff erence 
Principle to the “basic structure” of society: “the way in which the 
major social institutions distribute the fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation,” the 
sources of “deep inequalities.” Rawls, “Th eory”, supra note 88, § 2 at 6-7, 
§ 41 at 229. One pertinent question in constructing a Rawlsian-style 
Cosmopolitan Prioritarian perspective on medical tourism is whether 
the concept of “basic structure” is expansive enough to reach these 
kinds of meso- (if not micro-) level policy decisions. To crystallize the 
point, one might resist the application of a Rawlsian-style Cosmopolitan 
Prioritarianism to the medical tourism case not because one disagrees with 
it as the appropriate political theory to govern the international arena, 
but because one believes that in global context it should be limited to 
issues equivalent to those “basic structure” issues to which the Diff erence 
Principle applies in the domestic context, and that setting policy on 
medical tourism exceeds that “basic structure.” Beitz, the most notable 
advocate of expanding Rawls’ domestic Prioritarianism internationally, 
does not discuss the “basic structure” limitation in any depth in his book 
and takes as the possible target of a Global Diff erence Principle some 
quite specifi c policies. For example, he observes that “one might argue 
on the grounds of distributive justice for such policies as a generalized 
system of preferential tariff s for poor countries and the removal of 
nontariff  barriers for trade, or for the use of Special Drawing Rights in 
the International Monetary Fund as a form of development assistance.” 
See Beitz, supra note 89 at 174. In the health setting, others have followed 
suit, treating an issue like the pricing of pharmaceuticals in the developing 
world as the possible target of a Rawlsian-style Cosmopolitan Prioritarian 
argument. See e.g. Fisher & Syed, supra note 68 at 652-59. I think it is 
an open question whether these policies are ones that are properly within 
the ambit of Rawls’ own conception of the “basic structure,” or whether 
these authors are instead embracing a Rawlsian-style Cosmpolitan 
Prioritarianism that relaxes the basic structure constraint or adopts 
an expansive version of that concept. In any event, in developing a 
Cosmopolitan Prioritarian approach to medical tourism, I will follow 
Beitz and others in allowing a version of the Diff erence Principle to apply 
to somewhat less grand policy decisions, such as whether to regulate 
medical tourism, while noting some doubts about whether this is fully 
consistent with Rawls’ own vision as to the ambit of the basic structure.
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normative problem in medical tourism while avoiding a potential problem 
faced by the Utilitarian approach – the possibility of welfare gains to 
Americans or middle-class Indians counterbalancing welfare losses to 
poor Indians – because of the extreme priority given to the worst-off , 
who are likely to be India’s poor in this context.92 By contrast, the weaker 
version of Beitz’s approach instructs us to apply internationally whatever 
distributive justice policy one adopts domestically.93 Its implication 
for medical tourism is less clear and depends on the degree of priority 
given to the worst off , although it would seem to more clearly promote 
interventions restricting medical tourism than the Utilitarian approach.
A third Cosmopolitan approach is Suffi  cientarianism, according to 
which justice is not concerned with improving the lot of the least well-off  
(Prioritarianism) or achieving equality per se (Egalitarianism), but instead 
with ensuring that individuals do not fall below a particular threshold 
of whatever is the “currency” of distribution.94 Although emanating 
from a more Aristotelian starting point, we can understand Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s approach as roughly fi tting this category. 
In a nutshell, their approach is to discern the “functionings” central to 
a fl ourishing human life, determine the “capabilities” needed to attain 
those functionings, and then identify and fi x natural and social disparities 
to raise people to threshold in those capabilities. 95 In her latest work 
92. I say “likely” because it would depend in part on how “worst-off ” was 
defi ned; most welfarists would defi ne it in terms of total welfare, but 
a welfarist focused on health in particular might press for a focus on 
“sickest” rather than total welfare. Either way, I think it plausible that the 
poor Indian would qualify.
93. Beitz, supra note 89 at 174.
94. See Roger Crisp, “Equality, Priority, and Compassion” (2003) 113:4 
Ethics 745 at 756-63; Harry G Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal” 
(1987) 98:1 Ethics 21 at 21-25; Alexander Rosenberg, “Equality, 
Suffi  ciency, and Opportunity in the Just Society” (1995) 12:2 Social 
Philosophy & Policy 54.
95. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2006) at 155-216, 273-315 [Nussbaum, 
“Frontiers”] (setting out the Capabilities approach); Martha Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development: Th e Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 4-14 (describing the Capabilities 
approach similarly); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (New York: 
Harvard University Press, 1992) at 39-53 (describing the Capabilities 
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on the subject, Frontiers of Justice, which speaks directly to the issue of 
international justice, Nussbaum delineates ten capabilities, two of which 
are central for our purposes: “Life [– b]eing able to live to the end of the 
human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is 
so reduced as to be not worth living” and “Bodily Health [– b]eing able to 
have good health, including reproductive health.”96 Nussbaum indicates 
that the responsibility to achieve the threshold on these capabilities falls 
at all levels: on national governments, on international bodies, and even 
on corporations, and the failure of one institution to meet its obligations 
does not reduce the obligation of the others.97 She also makes clear 
that the thresholds are non-relativistic. For example, the threshold for 
adequate “life” or “bodily health” is the same if the citizen is American 
or Indian.98  
Th is approach off ers powerful reasons why the eff ects of medical 
tourism on health care access in destination countries ought to be a matter 
of substantial concern. While she does not attempt to operationalise 
where the health or life capability threshold should be set, Nussbaum’s 
description of these thresholds plausibly suggests that the Indian poor fall 
below the thresholds due to poor health care access (among other reasons, 
such as lack of adequate sanitation). On her theory, it would then be the 
responsibility of the United States, India, international bodies, and even 
the hospitals, insurers, and intermediaries involved in medical tourism to 
try to rectify that result.
Th at said, in applying the Suffi  cientarian approach to medical 
tourism, some problems latent in the theory become manifest. For out-
of-pocket or government-prompted medical tourism, many American 
users are poor and may themselves be below the threshold on life and 
bodily health. Consider, for example, a 1990 study suggesting that an 
African-American man living in Harlem was less likely to live until age 
sixty-fi ve than a Bangladeshi man, and tracing this in part to lack of 
approach similarly).
96. Nussbaum, “Frontiers”, ibid at 76-78.
97. Ibid at 171, 313-19.
98. Ibid at 78-81. For an application of Nussbaum’s approach to global health 
specifi cally, see Gostin, supra note 68 at 343-47.
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health care access.99 We may thus face a situation where we cannot raise 
everyone to the capability threshold, that is, a case of below-threshold 
tradeoff s. A number of authors have criticized Nussbaum for failing to 
provide guidance in such cases. 100 Again, this is less of a problem for 
insurer-prompted medical tourism, whose users will usually lie above the 
threshold. It may also not be a problem for restricting medical tourism 
for certain subcategories of treatments by Western patients that are not 
“health” related – cosmetic surgery and fertility tourism, for example 
(although whether the latter counts as “health” is a contested question),101 
because these treatments are less important for promoting the capabilities. 
Th is is an important divergence from the Utilitarian approach, which 
treats all inputs into welfare equally, whether classifi ed as health or not.
A second problem with this theory has to do with Nussbaum’s refusal 
to allow tradeoff s between capabilities. We may face confl icts between 
raising individuals to threshold on the Life/Health capabilities and raising 
99. Colin McCord & Harold P Freeman, “Excess Mortality in Harlem” 
(1990) 322:3 New England Journal of Medicine 173.
100. See e.g. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, “Disability and the Social 
Contract” (2007) 74:4 U Chicago L Rev 1615 at 1638; Singer, supra 
note 80; Mark Stein, “Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique” (2009) 50:2 
BCL Rev 489 at 504-14. Th is may mean that a modifi ed version of the 
Capabilities approach that breaks from Nussbaum in this regard will 
do better as a Cosmopolitan theory that can ground duties relating to 
medical tourism.
101. See e.g. I Glenn Cohen & Daniel Chen, “Trading-Off  Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption 
Rates and Should It Matter?” (2010) 95:1 Minn L Rev 485 at 500-05; 
Daniels, supra note 39 (off ering a theory of health tied to whether a defi cit 
causes a “departure from normal functioning that reduces an individual’s 
fair share of the normal opportunity range and gives rise to claims for 
assistance” and fi nding infertility to count because it interferes with 
“basic functions of free and equal citizens, such as reproducing themselves 
biologically, an aspect of plans of life that reasonable people commonly 
pursue” at 59); Nussbaum, “Frontiers”, supra note 95 at 76 (including 
reproductive health within the “bodily health” capability). Fleshing out 
what is and is not penumbral to “health” and on what theory is not my 
focus in this article. I will, however, note that even discussing categories 
like “cosmetic surgery” may be too crude in the fi nal analysis; to the 
extent the category encompasses both sex change operations and breast 
augmentation, each may call for a quite diff erent analysis.
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them to threshold on one or more of the eight other coequal capabilities 
we have thus far not discussed – for example “Play [– b]eing able to 
laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities” and “Senses, Imagination, 
and Th ought, [– b]eing able to use the senses to imagine, think, and 
reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed 
and cultivated by an adequate education.”102 If medical tourism improves 
recreational or educational opportunities (by increasing Indian GDP), it 
is unclear whether these increases to threshold in other capabilities could 
outweigh medical tourism’s negative eff ects on the “Bodily Health” and 
“Life Capabilities.”103 Th ese questions somewhat mirror those discussed 
as to the Cosmopolitan Utilitarian approach. One could try to alter the 
theory to adopt one of a series of methods of dealing with below-threshold 
cases: help the person who will make the biggest capability gain, help the 
person lowest down on the capabilities level, or maximize the number 
of people who are above threshold,104 each of which would somewhat 
strengthen the case against medical tourism. Such alterations would still, 
however, leave open the problem of across-capability tradeoff s.
While clearly aware of these problems, Nussbaum appears resistant 
to altering her theory much in this regard. She makes clear that “all ten 
of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements of justice, 
at least up to the threshold level,”105 that “the capabilities are radically 
102. Nussbaum, “Frontiers”, supra note 95 at 76-77.
103. Th ere is a separate set of issues relating to thresholds and timeframes. 
For example, medical tourism may in the short-term make it harder to 
achieve the threshold for currently existing Indian populations on these 
capabilities, but the development of India’s health sector and trickle-down 
may in the long-term raise more Indians (including not-yet-existing ones) 
to threshold. In part because of their complexity, see generally Louis 
Kaplow, “Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational 
Distributive Justice and Effi  ciency” (2007) 74:1 U Chicago L Rev 79 
(discussing complications involved with intergenerational discounting); 
John Broome, “Should We Value Population?” (2005) 13:4 Journal of 
Political Philosophy 399 (discussing complications in reasoning about 
the interests of future generations, and in part because these are domain-
general questions that almost all theories face in almost all contexts 
rather than specifi c problems for the Capabilities approach as to medical 
tourism, I note but largely bracket these issues here).
104. Stein, supra note 100 at 509-20.
105. Nussbaum, “Frontiers”, supra note 95 at 175.
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non-fungible: defi ciencies in one area cannot be made up simply by 
giving people a larger amount of another capability.”106 Her “theory does 
not countenance intuitionistic balancing or tradeoff s among them,” but 
instead “demands that they all be secured to each and every citizen, up to 
some appropriate threshold level.”107 She recognizes that “[i]n desperate 
circumstances, it may not be possible for a nation to secure them all up to 
the threshold level, but then it becomes a purely practical question what 
to do next, not a question of justice,” because “[t]he question of justice is 
already answered: justice has not been fully done here.”108  Th at posture, 
however, makes her theory less useful as a tool for normative analysis of 
medical tourism.
With the possible exception of Beitz’s strong Cosmopolitan 
Prioritarian thesis, perhaps surprisingly, the other Cosmopolitan theories 
also face some indeterminacies and problems when faced with the case 
study of medical tourism. Th at said, I think it is fair to say that they off er 
a strong prima facie case (if not a completely certain one) for condemning 
some forms of it.
Th ere are, however, two more pressing and related problems with 
relying too heavily on the Cosmopolitan theories to urge restrictions on 
medical tourism – one theoretical and one pragmatic.
Th e theoretical problem is that what these theories off er us is not 
a theory of when we are responsible for harms stemming from medical 
tourism, but when we ought to improve the lives of the badly-off 
simpliciter. In one sense, causation matters: only if restricting medical 
tourism causes an improvement in welfare for the worst off , the raising 
of health capabilities, etc., are we required to take the action. In another 
sense, however, causation in the historical and responsibility senses is 
irrelevant because it is the mere fact of the destination country’s citizens’ 
needs that imposes upon us the obligation to help them in whatever 
way we can, and not anything about medical tourism specifi cally. Th us, 
in one direction, the duties may persist even when medical tourism is 
eliminated or its harms are remedied in that the source of the obligation 
106. Ibid at 166-67.
107. Ibid at 175.
108. Ibid.
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is not anything we have done, but instead the destitute state of those 
abroad. In the other direction, once the theories’ goals are met (for 
example, they reach the suffi  cient level on the capabilities, to use one 
variant), we do not bear an obligation (at least under distributive justice 
principles) to prevent medical tourism or remedy its ill-eff ects, even if 
medical tourism continues to produce signifi cant health care defi cits for 
the destination country poor that would not occur if it were curbed. 
Moreover, it is possible that other forms of aid or assistance might “cancel 
out” whatever negative eff ects medical tourism has in terms of the global 
cosmopolitan calculus.
 To put the point another way, the problem is that the Cosmopolitan 
theory tells us to help those in the destination country who are badly-
off  by curbing medical tourism, whether or not medical tourism caused 
them to be badly-off ; this is to be contrasted with a diff erent kind of 
theory (more corrective justice in spirit) that would urge us to curb 
medical tourism because it causes people in the destination country to 
be worse off .
Further, these approaches also face what I will call a “self-infl icted 
wounds problem,” a problem that I will return to several times in this 
article. Th ese theories imply (subject to a qualifi cation) that it is not 
relevant to the scope of the home country’s obligation that some of the 
factors (discussed above) that cause medical tourism to negatively impact 
health care access in the destination country are within the destination 
country’s government’s control, i.e. that the destination country is partially 
responsible. Th e qualifi cation is that, to the extent that we could induce 
the destination country to alter these facts about its self-governance, such 
infl uence would be one tool to meet our obligations under these theories. 
But to the extent we are unable to prompt these alterations, under the 
Cosmopolitan approach, our responsibility to improve the welfare and 
capabilities of the poor in the destination country attaches even for the 
elements for which their own sovereign is actually responsible. 109
109. Nussbaum is the most explicit of the theorists in suggesting that the 
responsibility to achieve the threshold on these capabilities falls at all levels 
– on national governments, on international bodies, even on corporations 
– and that the failure of one institution to meet its obligations does not 
reduce the obligation of the others. See Nussbaum, “Frontiers”, supra 
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To some, these implications may seem problematic; from others, the 
reply will be, “It is just not that kind of theory.” More troubling, though, 
may be a pragmatic corollary: if we need to rely on these theories to 
convince public policymakers to take action on medical tourism, they 
threaten to prove too much. To borrow a phrase that Charles Fried has 
used in discussing Utilitarianism generally, all of these approaches threaten 
to become “oppressive in the totality of the claim they make on the moral 
agent”;110 addressing the harms caused by medical tourism is a small drop 
in the bucket in terms of what these theories would call upon us to do 
to right the balance between developed and developing countries. For 
starters, they would further demand that we radically increase taxes for all 
strata in our nation to fund large-scale water purifi cation, housing, and 
other interventions in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). As Th omas 
Pogge has stressed, unless a theory of Global Justice is politically feasible, 
it is “destined to remain a philosopher’s pipe dream.”111 It seems hard to 
believe that a principle as broad and demanding as the one espoused by 
Cosmopolitans of this sort would be compelling to US policymakers.
Again, some philosophers might chafe at this approach and say 
that if the Cosmopolitan approach is “right,” it matters not a lick that 
US political elites would never accept it. Even if we think that within 
the ambit of philosophy that response is correct,112  Pogge is also surely 
note 95 at 313-19. Th ere are some complicated dynamic elements I gloss 
over here. For example, if it turned out that, because of moral hazard 
issues, a theory of moral obligation that did hold the destination country 
responsible for its own role in these health care access defi cits in the long 
run actually improved the welfare/capabilities of the population more 
than one that did not – because the destination country sovereign would 
then have a greater incentive to clean its own house – then we might in 
fact adopt a system that apportioned responsibility even on these theories; 
however, that apportioning of responsibility would be pragmatic and 
instrumental, not because these theories suggests that the responsibility of 
the destination country diminishes that of the patients’ home country.
110. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1978) at 13.
111. Th omas W Pogge, “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research 
Program” (2005) 36:1-2 Metaphilosophy 182 at 185.
112. C.f. David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (if Any) of Political 
Philosophy” (2011) 39:3 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 207 (discussing 
whether the fact that human nature is such that we will never do 
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correct that, when it comes to trying to shift public policy, these kinds of 
considerations are king. In any event, to fi nd common ground with both 
those who would reject Cosmopolitanism as a philosophical matter and 
those who would reject it as a pragmatic matter, it would be desirable 
to show a normative obligation to correct health care access diminution 
from medical tourism on less demanding theories as well. I consider two 
sets of such theories next, Statist and Intermediate.113  
C.  Statist Th eories
Unlike Cosmopolitans, Statists reach the conclusion that the obligations 
of distributive justice apply only within the nation-state and not to 
citizens of other nations. I discuss the arguments of two of the best-
known expositors of this view, John Rawls and Th omas Nagel, before 
applying those arguments to medical tourism. As one might expect, 
justifying duties to curb medical tourism is diffi  cult for Statist approaches. 
However, what one might not expect, and as I show, is that even these 
approaches might mandate some limited regulatory interventions 
grounded in the Rawlsian duty to aid burdened states and the Nagelian 
duty of humanitarian aid. Th at said, I also express some misgivings about 
these ways out of the problem.
Statists limit justice-based duties of redistribution to the nation-state 
because “[w]hat lets citizens make redistributive claims on each other 
is not so much the fact that they share a cooperative structure,” but that 
societal rules establishing a sovereign state’s basic structure are “coercively 
imposed.” 114 Nagel clarifi es that this is because for Rawls (and contra the 
that which is called for by a political philosophy should matter for its 
evaluation).
113. A diff erent response is that we need not be so philosophically pure: we 
can endorse Cosmopolitanism in this limited domain while rejecting it 
elsewhere. Th at is, of course, an option, but then one bears the burden of 
justifying why, if one accepts the principle, one should adopt it here but 
not elsewhere. It is not clear to me that those espousing Cosmopolitanism 
only for medical tourism have a good answer to this question.
114. Mathias Risse, “What We Owe to the Global Poor” (2005) 9:1-2 Journal 
of Ethics 81 at 99-100 [emphasis in original]; see also John Rawls, Th e 
Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 16 
[Rawls, “Peoples”] (making a similar argument for the Statist approach); 
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Cosmopolitans), the “moral presumption against arbitrary inequalities is 
not a principle of universal application”’; rather “[w]hat is objectionable 
is that we should be fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively 
imposed legal and political institutions that generates such arbitrary 
inequalities.” 115 It is the “complex fact” that in societal rules establishing 
a sovereign state’s basic structure “we are both putative joint authors of 
the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to 
accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from 
our personal preferences – that creates the special presumption against 
arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system.”116  
Increasing globalization does not change the picture, say Nagel and 
Rawls, because “it is not enough that a number of individuals or groups 
be engaged in collective activity that serves their mutual advantage”; that 
is, “mere economic interaction does not trigger the heightened standards 
of socioeconomic justice.”117 Nor does the existence of international 
institutions such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization 
(WTO) trigger those obligations, according to Nagel, because their 
edicts “are not collectively enacted or coercively imposed in the name of 
all the individuals whose lives they aff ect.”118  Th at is, “[n]o matter how 
substantive the links of trade, diplomacy, or international agreement, the 
institutions present at the international level do not engage in the same 
kinds of coercive practices against individual agents”; it is “[c]oercion, 
not cooperation, [that] is the sine qua non of distributive justice.”119  
Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy” 
(2001) 30:3 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 257 at 285-89 (making a similar 
argument for the Statist approach).
115. Th omas Nagel, “Th e Problem of Global Justice” (2005) 33:2 Philosophy 
& Public Aff airs 113 at 127-28 [emphasis added].
116. Ibid at 128-29; see Blake, supra note 114 at 265, 289.
117. Nagel, supra note 115 at 138; see also Rawls, “Peoples”, supra note 114 at 
115-19 (making a similar point).
118. Nagel, ibid.
119. Blake, supra note 114 at 265, 289. Blake goes on to qualify this somewhat 
by indicating that this is “not to say that coercion does not exist in 
forms other than state coercion. Indeed, international practices can 
indeed be coercive – we might understand certain sorts of exploitative 
trade relationships under this heading, and so a theory concerned with 
autonomy must condemn such relationships or seek to justify them … 
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All of this seems to construct a dead end for Statist support for 
distributive justice-based duties in the medical tourism sector, as can be 
gleaned by comparing the medical tourism case to Nagel’s similar analysis 
of immigration. Nagel argues that, while “[t]he immigration policies of 
one country may impose large eff ects on the lives of those living in other 
countries,” this is not suffi  cient to “imply that such policies should be 
determined in a way that gives the interests and opportunities of those 
others equal consideration.”120  Th is is because “immigration policies are 
simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the laws are not 
imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those 
laws” and it is a “suffi  cient justifi cation” of these polices that they “do 
not violate [the immigrants’] prepolitical human rights.”121  In a similar 
vein, the medical tourism policies of home countries – whether merely 
permitting their citizens to purchase medical tourism out-of-pocket, 
permitting insurer-prompted medical tourism, or, in the extreme case 
of government-prompted medical tourism, creating state incentives to 
use medical tourism – are not being imposed in the name of destination 
country citizens, nor are those citizens or their governments being forced 
to open themselves up to medical tourism.122  
Nevertheless, I believe there exist in Statist theories at least two open 
avenues for grounding some limited obligations of home countries and 
international bodies to regulate medical tourism or mitigate its negative 
eff ects on health care access in destination countries.
Th e fi rst avenue stems from Rawls’ recognition of a duty (separate 
from those relating to distributive justice) to assist “burdened societies” 
– those whose “historical, social, and economic circumstances make their 
achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, diffi  cult if 
not impossible” – to “manage their own aff airs reasonably and rationally” 
[But] … only the relationship of common citizenship is a relationship 
potentially justifi able through a concern for equality in distributive 
shares.” Ibid at 265.
120. Nagel, supra note 115 at 129.
121. Ibid at 129-30.
122. See below notes 132-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of one 
complication related to the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
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in order to become “well-ordered societies.”123  Th ese societies “lack the 
political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, 
and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-
ordered” but, with assistance, can over time come to “manage their own 
aff airs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members 
of the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”124 Being a well-ordered society 
requires having a “decent system of social cooperation,” meaning that the 
state secures “a special class of urgent [human] rights, such as freedom 
from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, 
... security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide” and formal 
equality, that citizens view their law as imposing duties and obligations 
“fi tting with their common good idea of justice” and not “as mere 
commands imposed by force,” and that offi  cials believe that “the law is 
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice,” not “supported merely 
by force.”125  
Can regulation of medical tourism by patients’ home countries or 
international bodies be justifi ed on this rationale? Grounding medical 
tourism-related obligations in this kind of duty presents four challenges.
First, there is a question of coverage. Many of the destination 
countries in question may not be burdened societies; India, Mexico, 
Th ailand and Singapore, for example, may have poor populations facing 
defi cits in health care access, but they seem to meet Rawls’ more minimal 
criteria for being well-ordered. Th us, these obligations will apply, at most, 
only to medical tourism to a subset of destination countries. Th at itself 
is not fatal – the United States (or perhaps an international body) could 
theoretically prevent, tax, or allow incentives for medical tourism only to 
some destination countries in a manner akin to the “channeling” regimes 
I have elsewhere discussed 126 and return to in Part VI below – but it does 
complicate the picture, and it may be that the same factors that make 
these states burdened may make them unlikely to develop robust medical 
tourism industries.
123. Rawls, “Peoples”, supra note 114 at 90, 111.
124. Ibid at 106, 111.
125. Ibid at 66-68, 79.
126. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1515-23, 1559-61.
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Second, there is a problem as to the kind of aid envisioned by this 
duty. Rawls seems focused on institution building, and Mathias Risse 
suggests the duty’s targets as building things like “stable property rights, 
rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures to 
curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, 
and graft, quality and independence of courts, but also cohesiveness of 
society, existence of trust and social cooperation, and thus overall quality 
of civil society.”127 Foreign aid by home countries to help the destination 
countries improve their ability to produce more medical providers, or 
policy aid in designing health care system regulations designed to control 
how much time doctors spend in the public or private system – both 
factors likely to contribute to diminutions in access, as discussed above 
– seem to fi t nicely into this category and are well-supported by this 
approach. It is less clear that the same is true of regulation aimed at trying 
to prevent or make it more expensive for home country patients to travel 
to the destination country for medical tourism.
Th ird and relatedly, Rawls cautions that “well-ordered societies 
giving assistance must not act paternalistically, but in measured ways that 
do not confl ict with the fi nal aim of assistance: freedom and equality 
for the formerly burdened societies.”128 Again, economic aid for those 
abroad does not seem unduly paternalistic (unless perhaps conditioned 
on certain ways of spending or meeting certain conditions), but attempts 
by home countries or international bodies to limit the use of medical 
tourism by their populations (out-of-pocket, insurer-prompted, or 
government-prompted) when the destination country is ready to take all-
comers may run afoul of this limitation. Th us, this approach may limit 
the type of intervention a home state government can enact regarding 
medical tourism.
Fourth, it is also at least possible that the Rawlsian duty to aid 
burdened states might actually support leaving medical tourism 
unregulated (or even encouraging it). Because the duty does not aim to 
address diminutions in health care access caused by medical tourism (nor 
health needs at all per se), but instead fostering institution building, it is 
127. Risse, supra note 114 at 85.
128. Rawls, “Peoples”, supra note 114 at 111.
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possible that medical tourism may actually help build institutions in the 
destination country aiding the burdened state while diminishing health 
care access for the destination country poor. For example, the rise in 
GDP and the need for corporate accountability to support a medical 
tourism industry attractive to Westerners might carry with it benefi ts to 
the destination country in terms of establishing the rule of law or property 
rights. If so, medical tourism might itself represent aid to burdened states 
even while it diminishes health care access to the destination country’s 
poor.
Th us, the Rawlsian duty to aid burdened states seems to support 
only duties to help build up the health care capacity of the destination 
country and foreign aid more generally, and then only for the sub-set 
of states that qualify as burdened states. Further, those duties attach 
only so long as the burdened state has not transitioned to a well-ordered 
society; once it has made that transition, these duties are satisfi ed even 
if medical tourism continues to signifi cantly diminish health care access 
in the destination countries. Finally, the duty to aid burdened states is 
also not a perfect fi t for the argument because it is at least possible for 
medical tourism that diminishes health care access to the poor to itself 
serve in building institutions and aiding burdened states, in which case 
it ought to be encouraged or left alone rather than prohibited. Th us, the 
approach justifi es only a much smaller sub-set of possible interventions 
regarding medical tourism, but does not rule out a duty of home state 
action entirely.
Th e other avenue is Nagel’s separate conception of humanitarian 
duties of aid. Nagel suggests that “there is some minimal concern we owe 
to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition 
and early death from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in 
dire poverty are,” such that “some form of humane assistance from the 
well-off  to those in extremis is clearly called for quite apart from any 
demand of justice, if we are not simply ethical egoists.”129  Although he 
is self-admittedly vague, he thinks “the normative force of the most 
basic human rights against violence, enslavement, and coercion, and of 
the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate danger, 
129. Nagel, supra note 115 at 118.
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depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other people’s shoes,” 
and speaks of obligations to relieve others, whatever their nation, “from 
extreme threats and obstacles to [the freedom to pursue their own 
ends] if we can do so without serious sacrifi ce of our own ends.”130  In a 
similar vein, Michael Blake suggests a duty to provide “access to goods 
and circumstances” enabling people “to live as rationally autonomous 
agents, capable of selecting and pursuing plans of life in accordance 
with individual conceptions of the good” and singles out “famine, 
extreme poverty, [and] crippling social norms such as caste hierarchies,” 
as the kinds of things against which we have obligations to intervene 
notwithstanding the citizenship of the victim.131 
Can this approach ground duties relating to medical tourism? Fisher 
and Syed suggest that a duty of Western countries to expand access to 
drugs in LDCs can be grounded in these humanitarian duties because 
there “is little question that millions of people are suff ering and dying 
from contagious diseases in developing countries and that the residents 
of developed countries could alleviate that suff ering with relative ease.” 132
A parallel argument, however, seems somewhat harder to make in 
the context of medical tourism interventions. For one thing, while we 
lack good empirical data on the ill eff ects of medical tourism on health 
care access abroad, it is unlikely at present that it is causing “millions of 
people” to die in destination countries – its eff ects are more marginal. 
Of course, the millions of deaths in the drug development case are not 
the sine qua non for humanitarian duties; there may be “early death 
from easily preventable diseases” that curbing medical tourism might 
prevent. Lack of access to care is as sure a killer as is famine or lack 
of needed pharmaceuticals, and, over a longer time horizon, its eff ects 
may be more signifi cant. Still, we should be cautious when specifying 
the level of deprivation needed to trigger these humanitarian duties 
since the resulting duties are not medical-tourism-specifi c; that is, if we 
decide a particular kind of deprivation is enough to trigger our duty to 
intervene here, we will bear a comparable duty to all citizens of that 
130. Ibid at 131.
131. Blake, supra note 114 at 271.
132. Fisher & Syed, supra note 68 at 649.
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foreign country in comparable conditions. Too expansive a conception 
of the humanitarian duty will result in few meaningful diff erences 
between obligations of humanitarian and distributive justice and may 
have signifi cant implications for issues like our general immigration 
policy that Nagel (and other Statists) have rejected.133 Th at is, if the 
health care defi cits experienced due to medical tourism are enough to 
ground humanitarian duties regarding medical tourism, should we not 
also open our immigration doors to those suff ering comparable defi cits 
in their home countries?134 Too expansive a conception would raise the 
very pragmatic and political concerns about the scope of the demands 
placed upon us that we aimed to avoid by seeking a non-Cosmopolitan 
approach.
Second, the question of whether we “could alleviate that suff ering 
with relative ease” or “without serious sacrifi ce of our own ends” (to use 
Nagel’s terms) is more diffi  cult in this context in ways that mirror our 
discussion of Cosmopolitan theories. At least for medical tourism by 
those paying out-of-pocket and, to a lesser extent, for some forms of 
government-prompted medical tourism, trying to satisfy humanitarian 
duties to the global poor by curbing medical tourism is more likely to 
come at the expense of our own poor than in the pharmaceutical case. 
Th us, in the exceptional case, we may face tradeoff s not only between 
satisfying our humanitarian duties to our own poor versus those to the 
poor abroad, but also between our distributive justice duties to our poor 
and our humanitarian duties to the destination country poor. Neglecting 
our duties to our own poor patients would seem to count as “serious 
sacrifi ce of our own ends,” suggesting the obligations may more clearly 
attach to some forms of medical tourism, including insurer-prompted 
medical tourism, where paying more for health insurance is less clearly 
a “serious sacrifi ce of our own ends.” Similarly, the humanitarian duty 
133. Nagel, supra note 115 at 129-30.
134. Th e “without serious sacrifi ce of our own ends” constraint discussed in 
the next section might be thought to distinguish the immigration case, 
although Nagel at least wants to dispose of the immigration case on the 
threshold question of whether humanitarian duties attach (ibid). In any 
event, as I discuss in the next paragraph, there are problems with that 
constraint as to medical tourism as well.
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approach might more easily justify curbing medical tourism for services 
like cosmetic surgeries that are more penumbral to health. Th is restriction 
may also limit us to interventions that do not restrict access to health 
care via medical tourism for our citizens but instead aid the destination 
country in building capacity; even that is tricky, though, for dollars 
spent on foreign aid could always be reallocated to improving Medicaid 
coverage for America’s poor, to give but one example. 135 
Finally, notice that, like the Cosmopolitan theories, the duty towards 
humanitarian aid is actually somewhat divorced from medical tourism 
– if we have satisfi ed the duty of humanitarian aid, then even if medical 
tourism continues to have harmful eff ects on the destination country we 
have no obligation to restrict it; if foreign citizens still remain below the 
135. A diff erent way forward, at least in the US case, would be to get at the 
presumptive “root” of the problem prompting much of the medical 
tourism trade: that too many Americans are uninsured or underinsured or 
lack aff ordable care options, and turn to medical tourism as a solution. See 
Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1479-81. In principle, that 
would be a very desirable solution, but the Obama Health Care Reform, 
the most ambitious move in this direction in the last fi fty years, has been 
estimated by the most recent Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO) scoring 
to leave twenty-three million nonelderly residents uninsured if and when 
it is fully implemented in 2019, and countless more underinsured; Letter 
from Douglas W Elmendorf, Dir, Cong Budget Offi  ce, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker, US House of Representatives (18 March 2010) table 2, online: 
Congressional Budget Offi  ce <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/21327>. 
Th at reform is now under signifi cant attack in the courts, the Congress, 
and in US public opinion, but even if it withstands the barrage, the 
bill as passed would still leave many US users of out-of-pocket medical 
tourism, and it is hard to conceive that there will be political will to 
make the necessary investments to further reduce the number of un-and 
underinsured in the foreseeable future. Here again is a place where it 
seems plausible to me that the philosophical and policy discourse split 
– it may be that the United States ought to deal with medical tourism 
by cleaning its own house fi rst, but if we concede (as I think we should) 
that this is not within the political feasibility set, then we are back in 
a philosophically second-best world where we must ask what steps the 
United States should take regarding medical tourism directly. Another 
way of putting this point is that in a world of ideal justice, there would be 
no uninsured medical tourists, and these comments should be understood 
as speaking to the non-ideal world. C.f. Rawls, “Th eory”, supra note 88 § 
39 at 244-46.
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humanitarian level after medical tourism is eliminated or its harms are 
remedied, we still must aid more. To the extent that one was convinced 
that this aspect of Cosmopolitan theories was undesirable as a ground 
for duties as to medical tourism, one should also be wary of the Statist 
humanitarian duties approach.
While, as expected, the Statist theories reject grounding duties as to 
medical tourism in the distributive justice obligations to those abroad, 
there may be some room for obligations grounded in duties to aid 
burdened states or provide humanitarian aid. While the former may 
create obligations to help build institutional capacity to deliver health 
care abroad or foreign aid, it will not be appropriate for many destination 
countries. Th e latter may be more promising, but if the threshold for 
humanitarian need is kept relatively high, as I believe it should be, home 
countries will owe humanitarian duties relating to medical tourism only 
when acting will prevent grave humanitarian disasters and when the 
burden on home country citizens will not be serious. As I have argued, 
such duties will most likely aff ect only cases of insurer-prompted medical 
tourism and medical tourism for less-essential service and may be limited 
to providing aid rather than curbing the home countries’ citizens’ medical 
tourism use. Further, as with the Cosmopolitan theories, I have expressed 
concern that these approaches generate theories about satisfying health 
needs, rather than about obligations stemming from medical tourism.
D.  Intermediate Th eories
A fi nal set of theories seeks to position itself between the Statist and 
Cosmopolitan camps. I consider two such intermediate theories and 
their application to medical tourism: the fi rst is put forth by Joshua 
Cohen and Charles Sabel, and applied to health care by Norman Daniels, 
and the second is put forth by Th omas Pogge. I think these are the 
most fertile grounds for a Global Justice-based theory of obligations to 
regulate medical tourism because they generate a kind of theory more 
appropriate for the task: one that focuses on the harms and institutions 
stemming from particular existing practices rather than one that focuses 
on the relative holdings of particular individuals at the current moment 
and counsels a more general reallocation of primary goods. Th at said, as 
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applied to this specifi c problem, the theories run into some problems.
1.  Cohen, Sabel & Daniels
Th e Cohen, Sabel, and Daniels approach suggests the Statists are too 
demanding in requiring coercion as the touchstone of distributive justice 
principles and also too “all-or-nothing” in the deployment of those 
principles. Instead, these authors propose lesser duties of “inclusion” 
internationally, which fall short of full-blown distributive justice but are 
greater than the minimal humanitarian duties endorsed by Statists: the 
state should treat those outside of the coercive structure of the nation-
state as individuals whose good “counts for something” (not nothing) 
even if it falls short of the full consideration a state would give its own 
citizens. 136  
Cohen and Sabel suggest these duties of inclusion may be triggered 
inter alia by the “coercion-lite” (my term) actions of international bodies 
such as the WTO; that is, “[e]ven when rule-making and applying 
bodies lack their own independent power to impose sanctions through 
coercion,” they still shape conduct “by providing incentives and 
permitting the imposition of sanctions” and “withdrawing from them 
may be costly to members (if only because of the sometimes considerable 
loss of benefi ts),” such that “[i]n an attenuated but signifi cant way, our 
wills – the wills of all subject to the rule making-authority – have been 
implicated, suffi  ciently such that rules of this type can only be imposed 
with a special justifi cation.”137 
Th ey off er the example of the WTO, suggesting that “[o]pting out 
is not a real option” because no country in the developed or developing 
world could really survive without participation in the WTO, and once 
one is in for a penny, one is in for a pound; a member country cannot 
pick and choose which parts of the WTO’s demands to comply with, 
such that “there is a direct rule-making relationship between the global 
136. See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?” 
(2006) 34:2 Philosophy & Public Aff airs 147 at 154-55; Daniels, supra 
note 39 at 351.
137. Cohen & Sabel, ibid at 165.
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bodies and the citizens of diff erent states.”138  Th ey argue that for the 
WTO, duties of inclusion would mean that the rulemakers are “obligated 
to give some weight to the reasonable concern of the rule takers (who 
are themselves assumed to have responsibility to show concern for the 
interests of their own citizens).”139 
Th e authors also suggest consequential rulemaking by international 
bodies “with distinct responsibilities,” such as the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), might require those bodies to adopt duties of 
inclusion.140  More specifi cally, they claim that this obligation follows 
from three facets of the ILO: that the ILO has taken on the responsibility 
for formulating labour standards (geared towards eliminating child and 
forced labour, ending employment discrimination, promoting collective 
bargaining, etc.); that the ILO claims that its rulemakings have signifi cant 
consequences; and that the ILO believes that, if it were to disappear, no 
comparable entity would emerge.141  
Daniels adds that certain kinds of international independencies 
may also give rise to duties of inclusion, giving the example of medical 
migration (brain drain). He argues that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s historical requirement that countries like Cameroon make severe 
cutbacks in their publicly-funded health care systems in order to reduce 
defi cits that result in poorer working conditions for medical personnel 
(a “push” factor), combined with the attempt by the United Kingdom 
and other OECD countries to recruit medical personnel from developing 
countries (a “pull” factor), gives rise to a duty on the part of Western 
countries and the IMF to address the ill eff ects of this migration.142 
Among the methods to satisfy that obligation, he urges altering “the terms 
of employment in receiving countries of health workers from vulnerable 
countries,” compensating for “the lost training costs of these workers,” 
“prohibit[ing] recruitment from vulnerable countries,” and “giv[ing] aid 
to contributing countries in order to reduce the push factor.”143  
138. Ibid at 168.
139. Ibid at 172.
140. Ibid at 170-71.
141. See ibid.
142. See Daniels, supra note 39 at 337-39.
143. Ibid.
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Can this approach be readily applied to medical tourism? One might 
be tempted to draw three analogies, but each of them faces problems that 
make the medical tourism case harder than the ones these authors have 
taken on.
First, one might suggest that intermediaries, and particularly medical 
tourism accreditors like the Joint Commission International (JCI), bear 
some duties to build consideration of the eff ects of medical tourism to a 
particular facility on health care access for destination country poor into 
their accreditation processes, in analogy to the ILO example. One might 
argue that the JCI is like the ILO in that it has taken on responsibility for 
formulating standards, it claims its rules have signifi cant consequences 
(determining who gets accredited, causing facilities to alter their 
procedures), and perhaps if it disappeared no other institution would 
take its place.144  
On refl ection, though, the analogy is problematic. Th e JCI’s role 
is to accredit foreign hospitals, specifi cally to examine their procedures 
and determine whether those procedures meet relevant standards 
of practice.145 While this might be loosely thought of as a kind of 
“rulemaking,” the JCI does not purport to regulate the medical tourism 
market, let alone to weigh the advantages or disadvantages of a particular 
country or particular hospital opening itself up to medical tourism. Th e 
same points apply even more strongly to intermediaries who are largely 
for-profi t entities.
Second, we might analogize to the medical migration example and 
say that, for patients paying out-of-pocket, the lack of aff ordable health 
144. Th is last point of comparison seems dubious. Even with the JCI in place, 
it faces competition in accreditation, including from the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). Th e ISO has a less popular 
certifi cation program that has been used to certify some hospitals in 
Mexico, India, Th ailand, Lebanon, and Pakistan. See Arnold Milstein 
& Mark Smith, “America’s New Refugees – Seeking Aff ordable Surgery 
Off shore” (2006) 355:16 New England Journal of Medicine 1637 at 
1639. Th us, if the JCI were to disappear, there is every reason to believe 
others would take its place. Th at said, while Daniels describes the ILO as 
having these three characteristics, it may be that meeting the fi rst two is 
suffi  cient to ground the duties he has in mind.
145. See Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1485; Cortez, supra 
note 46 at 83-84.
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insurance in the US system, and its failure to prevent insurer-prompted 
medical tourism, drives medical tourism, much like the United Kingdom’s 
recruitment of foreign nurses drives migration. Accepting that analogy, 
however, would cause the intermediate theory to lose much of its appeal. 
In medical tourism by patients paying out-of-pocket, we do not have 
the US government or international bodies directly creating push and 
pull factors. True, the US government has not taken steps to prevent 
travel to India for medical procedures – for example, by criminalizing 
consumption in the way it does child sex tourism abroad under the 
PROTECT Act of 2003146  – but if merely not acting and following a 
background norm of permitting travel to consume goods and services 
abroad is suffi  cient under Daniels’ intermediate theory, the theory loses 
much of its attraction as a middle ground between the Cosmopolitan and 
Statist poles because so much of the day-to-day workings of international 
trade will trigger obligations under the theory.
Th at said, it seems to me that government-sponsored medical tourism 
initiatives such as that considered by West Virginia and that proposed for 
Medicare and Medicaid would fi t the medical migration analogy quite 
well and might create US obligations to destination countries, at least 
insofar as tourism is incentivized and not merely covered in a way that 
is cost-neutral from the point of view of the patient. Medical tourism 
in universal health care countries prompted by long wait times might 
also better fi t the analogy – the failure to produce suffi  cient medical 
practitioners in the patient’s home country might prompt attempts 
either to recruit foreign providers (brain drain) or to incentivize medical 
tourism. However, the propriety of that last potential analogy seems 
to be a closer question, and it is unclear where the stopping point is 
from that analogy to the (problematic) conclusion that the fundamental 
organization of one’s domestic health care system might trigger duties of 
inclusion internationally based on home country patients’ reactions to 
it.147 
146. 18 USC § 2423(c), (f ) (2006); see also Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, 
supra note 14 at 1511-16 (discussing this as a possible intervention for 
regulating medical tourism).
147. To put the point in an exaggerated way: suppose that the underlying 
principle advocated by these authors was “for any domestic policy choice 
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Th ird, one might focus on the obligations some destination countries 
have undertaken to open up their health care sectors to medical tourism 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)148 and argue 
that it plays a “coercion-lite” role analogous to the obligations of WTO 
membership discussed by these authors. 149 While GATS imposes general 
obligations that apply to all WTO members, it imposes obligations 
relating to “market access”150 and “national treatment”151 on countries 
that have explicitly elected to be bound by them. Th ese obligations – 
called “specifi c commitments” – are made as to particular service sectors 
and particular modes of service (consumption abroad, cross-border 
supply, etc.).152 Violations of these obligations are subject to trade 
sanctions. Medical tourism might be implicated by a country’s specifi c 
commitment to open up its “Hospital Services” sector, which includes 
inter alia surgical, medical, ob-gyn, nursing, laboratory, radiological, 
anesthesiological, and rehabilitation services.153  
our country makes, be it health, education, transportation, etc., we are 
responsible for remediating any eff ects that follow, whether the conduit 
is changes in trade, consumption, or travel by our populace.” Th at would 
make it mysterious why they paid such careful attention to particular 
institutional relations, such as the ILO, TRIPS, or poaching of doctors. 
On this principle that analysis was superfl uous, the answer was much, 
much simpler. I thus have serious doubts that this is what these authors 
had in mind. Of course, that is a matter of interpretation. Perhaps more 
pointedly, if this is the principle that underlies the intermediate approach, 
it ceases to be a distinctive middle ground between the Cosmopolitan and 
Statist theories that can focus on particular institutional arrangements, 
coercion, and interdependency. Further, such a broad principle 
reintroduces the pragmatic policy-oriented worry I discussed above that 
the intermediate approach advantageously seemed poised to avoid.
148. 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1167 (entered into force 1 January 1995) 
[GATS]. 
149. See Patricia J Arnold & Terrie C Reeves, “International Trade and Health 
Policy: Implications of the GATS for US Healthcare Reform” (2006) 
63:4 Journal of Business Ethics Reform 313 at 315; Cohen, “Protecting 
Patients”, supra note 14 at 1521, n 213.
150. GATS, supra note 148 at art XVI.
151. Ibid, art XVII.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid, art III; see also Arnold & Reeves, supra note 149 at 316-18 
(discussing the relationship between GATS and trade in health services); 
Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1521, n 213 (discussing 
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To be sure, the analogy (and thus, duties of inclusion) will only 
apply to countries that have undertaken obligations under GATS to 
open up their health care systems. Even as to these countries, though, the 
theory faces the self-infl icted wounds problem. Th e decision to become a 
signatory of GATS and open up one’s medical system to medical tourism 
is itself within the control of the destination country, so how could it 
give rise to duties of inclusion on the part of the other signatories? In 
responding to a similar objection to their WTO example, Cohen and 
Sable suggest the point “seems almost facetious” because “[o]pting out 
is not a real option (the WTO is a ‘take it or leave it’ arrangement, 
without even the formal option of picking and choosing the parts to 
comply with), and given that it is not, and that everyone knows it is not, 
there is a direct rule-making relationship between the global bodies and 
the citizens of diff erent states.” 154 Th is same response, however, is much 
less persuasive in the GATS/medical tourism context because unlike 
the all-or-nothing WTO agreements, the GATS specifi c commitment 
obligations are incredibly versatile, with individual states making 
individual commitments as to individual modes for individual sectors. 155 
Th e proof is to some extent in the pudding: as WTO offi  cials Rudolf 
Adlung and Antonia Carzaniga recently observed, across the board there 
is a “generally shallow level of [GATS-specifi c] commitments on health 
services” with “no service sector[s] other than that of education [having] 
drawn fewer bindings among WTO Members than the health sector.” 156 
Indeed, in 2001 across all GATS modes only forty-four members made 
commitments as to hospital services and only twenty-nine to services 
provided by nurses, midwives, etc.; and, while there are generally more 
commitments in LDCs, the pattern is far from uniform.157  Th us, the 
take-it-or-leave-it, off er-you-can’t-refuse type of argument relied on by 
Cohen, Sable, and Daniels in their discussion seems to have less traction 
the relationship between GATS and medical tourism).
154. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 136 at 168.
155. Ibid.
156. Rudolf Adlung & Antonia Carzaniga, “Health Services Under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services” (2001) 79:4 Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 352 at 356-58.
157. Ibid.
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here.
Th is diffi  culty may not be fatal, and one way out might be to borrow 
two ideas from the philosophical work done by Gopal Sreenivasan on the 
eff ect of GATS rules on national choices and how those rules restrict eff orts 
to expand public health care. In responding to a similar self-infl icted 
wounds problem, Sreenivasan fi rst suggests (though he does not fully 
embrace the idea) that while “[v]olunteering for treaty obligations is an 
exercise of sovereign authority ... sovereignty and democratic legitimacy 
are not the same thing,” and the issue of democratic legitimacy turns on 
the “kind of popular mandate [that] existed for various decisions taken 
in relation to the GATS.”158  
Th is would obviously rule out the validity of GATS restrictions for 
dictator states, but also, he suggests, call into question the validity of other 
less-than-democratic forms of mandate: he contrasts the way GATS was 
subject to the possibility of a popular referendum in Switzerland before 
approval with the way the US Congress ratifi ed the agreement not as a 
treaty, but as ordinary legislation, and did so via approval of the Uruguay 
Round, in which all the terms of the agreement had to be accepted or 
rejected at once.159  By analogy, one could argue that because some of the 
destination countries also ratifi ed GATS in these less-than-democratic 
ways, the fact that they chose to enter GATS should not stand in the way 
of establishing obligations to these countries on Daniels’ intermediate 
theory (i.e. compliance with GATS should not be considered a “self-
infl icted wound”). Sreenivasan himself seems understandably ambivalent 
about how far to take this response, and wonders whether we should 
instead presume a popular mandate as to ordinary legislation. 160
Second, and I think more confi dently, Sreenivasan argues that 
because GATS imposes obligations in an intergenerational sense and 
the penalties for exiting GATS are so large, GATS should be thought 
of as more akin to constitutional obligations, like a Bill of Rights, than 
ordinary legislation. Sreenivasan’s conclusion is not that “nothing can 
158. Gopal Sreenivasan, “Does the GATS Undermine Democratic Control 
Over Health?” (2005) 9:1-2 Journal of Ethics 269 at 274-75.
159. Ibid at 275.
160. Ibid at 275-76.
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confer democratic legitimacy on eff ectively compulsory obligations that 
span generations,” which “would certainly be going too far”; instead, 
his claim is that these kinds of obligations “require special measures of 
democratic scrutiny in order to gain legitimacy,” such as the supermajority 
and dedicated referendums that are commonly required for constitutional 
amendments. 161
I do not attempt to fully assess the merits of Sreenivasan’s argument 
here. Instead, my more limited goal is to show that, although Sreenivasan’s 
work is on democratic legitimacy and not international justice obligations, 
it is possible that Cohen, Sable, and Daniels might graft his approach (or 
a variant of it) onto their own theory to off er a diff erent kind of response 
to the self-infl icted wounds problem in the medical tourism context; 
indeed, this solution, suggested by the application to this case, may be 
a more generalized direction in which their theory might be extended. 
Doing so might mean that duties of inclusion arise as to medical tourism, 
but only as to the subset of destination countries who have made GATS 
commitments impinging on their ability to resist medical tourism, that 
(1) are dictatorships (or perhaps without a popular mandate) or (2) 
have ratifi ed GATS in ways that do not meet specifi ed requirements for 
democratic legitimacy of “eff ectively compulsory obligations that span 
generations.” 162
While this may adequately deal with the “self-infl icted” wounds 
problem relating to GATS, several of the triggering conditions for 
medical tourism’s negative eff ects on health care access in the destination 
country – the supply of health care professionals, whether the system 
is regulated in such a way that requires professionals to spend time in 
both the public and private systems – are, as I stressed above, also at 
161. Ibid at 277-79.
162. I say “might” because one might counter that the self-infl icted wounds 
problem is “turtles, turtles all the way down.” If these features of the 
destination country’s political system led to defi cits in ratifying GATS, 
one might counter that those features are themselves “self-infl icted 
wounds,” within the control of the destination country. On such an 
argument, it would not only be the GATS-ratifying decision itself, 
but also the constitutional or other political structure that sets up this 
mechanism for ratifying treaties that would itself have to have contain the 
features Sreenivasan suggests are necessary for democratic legitimacy.
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least partially within the control of the destination country governments. 
Th ese decisions represent ordinary legislation, not the extraordinary kind 
relating to GATS and, in most cases, will enjoy a popular mandate of 
some sort. 163
Do these kinds of self-infl icted wounds not blunt the claim that 
home country governments or international bodies bear responsibility 
for defi cits associated with medical tourism? Yes and no. As Daniels 
has persuasively argued, even countries with similar domestic policies 
experience signifi cant diff erences in population health, such that “[e]ven 
if primary responsibility for population health rests with each state, this 
does not mean that the state has [the] sole responsibility.” 164 In order to 
clarify home countries’ obligations, we ought to try to factor out the 
elements of destination countries’ population health defi cits caused by 
medical tourism that are a result of the domestic policy decisions 165 and 
then apply the Cohen, Sable, and Daniels duties of inclusion only to the 
remaining defi cits that meet the theories’ requirements.
Th is ability to apportion responsibility between the destination and 
home countries seems like a major theoretical advantage of this approach 
as against the prior ones discussed. Of course, while conceptually simple 
to state, actually doing such apportioning would be extremely diffi  cult 
in practice, and the absolute best we can practicably hope for is a rough 
approximation. Th us, only in instances of medical tourism where a 
plausible case of “coercion-lite” or other pressure can be said to give 
rise to a duty of inclusion will such duties attach, and only then as to 
the proportion of the defi cits caused by medical tourism to health care 
access by the destination country poor that is outside the control of the 
destination country.
163. Again, it remains open to press the stronger version of the argument 
about which Sreenivasan is ambivalent – that even ordinary legislation 
requires a form of direct democratic or supermajoritarian check to “count” 
as the will of the people for international justice purposes and create 
a self-infl icted wound. I feel ambivalent enough about this claim (as I 
think Sreenivasan does) that I would not want to press this as a way of 
avoiding the self-infl icted wounds problem, but others may fi nd it a more 
appealing approach to the issue.
164. Daniels, supra note 39 at 345.
165. See ibid at 341-45.
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Even if one of these routes validly triggers a duty of inclusion on 
some home countries or international bodies for some sets of medical 
tourism, there is the further question of what that duty entails. Th e 
authors are self-admittedly somewhat vague about the contours of these 
kinds of duties, telling us that it is not a duty of “equal concern” or 
redistributive justice on the one hand, but that it requires more than mere 
humanitarian duties on the other, and that it requires treating individuals 
abroad as individuals whose good “counts for something” (not nothing) 
while making decisions that will impact their life. 166
Th at leaves a fair amount of room to maneuver. One could imagine 
the duties mandating something like “notice and comment rulemaking” 
in administrative law – which would merely require acknowledging 
that these interests were considered, but found to be outweighed 167 – 
to something approaching a weighting formula in which the welfare of 
those abroad is counted as .8 while those in the nation state are counted 
as 1 (to use purely fi ctional discounting factors).
In discussing the brain drain example, Daniels seems to suggest 
duties of inclusion should have signifi cant bite, arguing that they might 
prohibit recruitment from vulnerable countries, force recruiting countries 
to restrict the terms they off er foreign health workers, compensate for 
losses suff ered when health care workers are lost, or give aid to help 
reduce push factors. 168 By analogy, in the context of medical tourism, 
such duties could perhaps require the United States to prevent its citizens 
from traveling abroad, channel its patients to medical tourism facilities or 
countries with programs to ameliorate health care defi cits that result, tax 
medical tourists, intermediaries, or insurers, and use that revenue as aid 
aimed at amelioration, or provide more general aid to build institutional 
health care capacity in the destination country or, more appropriately, 
regulate its health care sector. I return to regulatory design options in 
greater depth in the next Part.
166. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 136 at 154-55; see also Daniels, supra note 39 
at 351 (making a similar point in the health context).
167. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 553 (2000); John F Manning 
& Matthew C Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation (New York: 
Foundation Press, 2010) at 604-40.
168. Daniels, supra note 39 at 353-54.
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2.  Pogge
A quite diff erent intermediate theory, to which it will be diffi  cult to give 
justice in this short space, is suggested by Th omas Pogge. Pogge begins 
with the idea that all people have rights to a “minimally worthwhile life” 
and therefore require a share of minimum levels of basic goods, including 
health care, that are essential to a decent life – he terms such goods 
“human rights.” 169 According to Pogge’s theory, citizens of one state have 
an obligation to avoid “harming” citizens of another state by imposing 
“defi cits” on their access to these human rights; that is, he argues that 
“[w]e are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in 
imposing” a “global institutional order ... [that] foreseeably perpetuates 
large-scale human rights defi cits that would be reasonably avoided 
through foreseeable institutional modifi cations.” 170
Pogge applies his approach to many examples, but the closest to 
ours is his claim that wealthy countries have an obligation to loosen 
their enforcement of the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical 
companies to drugs that LDCs desperately need. In this application 
of his approach, Pogge suggests that “[m]illions would be saved from 
disease and death if generic producers could freely manufacture and 
market life-saving drugs” in those countries. 171 Part of his ire is focused 
on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement, membership in which was made a condition of joining the 
WTO and requires members to grant twenty-year product patents on 
new medicines. Pogge suggests that the TRIPS Agreement, which he 
claims was disastrous for LDCs, “foreseeably excludes the global poor 
from access to vital medicines for the sake of enhancing the incentives 
to develop new medicines for the sake of the affl  uent,” and asks, “[h]ow 
can the imposition of such a regime be justifi ed to the global poor?” 172 
169. Th omas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass: 
Polity, 2002) at 48-49; see also Fisher & Syed, supra note 68 at 644-45 
(discussing Pogge’s account).
170. Th omas Pogge, “World Poverty and Human Rights” (2005) 19:1 Ethics 
& International Aff airs 1 at 5; see also Daniels, supra note 39 at 337-39 
(discussing Pogge’s account).
171. Pogge, ibid at 6; Pogge, supra note 169 at 74.
172. Th omas Pogge, “Access to Medicines” (2008) 1:2 Public Health Ethics 73 
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Pogge instead proposes a tax-based fund that operates as a prize system 
rewarding drug companies for their products’ contribution to reductions 
in the global burden of disease. 173
In a second example paralleling one used by Cohen, Sable, and 
Daniels, he claims that many WTO policies cause human rights defi cits 
because they permit the affl  uent countries’ “continued and asymmetrical 
protections of their markets through tariff s, quotas, anti-dumping 
duties, export credits and huge subsidies to domestic producers,” and 
thereby “greatly [impair] export opportunities for the very poorest.”174 
 In response, Pogge suggests that the rich countries have an obligation to 
“[scrap] their protectionist barriers against imports from poor countries,” 
which he claims would lower unemployment and increase wage levels in 
those countries. 175
Might the same claims hold as to medical tourism? One might say 
it also “foreseeably excludes the global poor from access to” health care 
“for the sake of enhancing” the health care access and cost savings in the 
West. Further, like Pogge’s own examples, one could say that medical 
tourism is supported by the existing institutional order insofar as that 
order facilitates things like international travel; standard setting; the 
accreditation of foreign hospitals; the training and credentialing of 
foreign doctors in the United States and other developed countries; etc. 176
However, there are a few problems (or at least open questions) that 
become manifest through this application to medical tourism. First, what 
is the content of a human right to health? Or, to put it otherwise, how 
at 75.
173. Ibid at 76-78.
174. Pogge, supra note 170 at 6.
175. Ibid. As a descriptive matter, Pogge’s account of the negative eff ects of 
TRIPS is not without dissenting view. See e.g. Rachel Brewster, “Th e 
Surprising Benefi ts to Developing Countries of Linking International 
Trade and Intellectual Property” (2011) 12 Chicago J Int’l L 1.
176. See generally Cortez, supra note 46 (discussing the way these things 
facilitate medical tourism); Aaditya Mattoo & Randeep Rathindran, 
“How Health Insurance Inhibits Trade in Health Care” (2006) 25:2 
Health Aff airs 358 (presenting a similar discussion); Graham T 
McMahon, “Coming to America – International Medical Graduates in 
the United States” (2014) 350:24 New England Journal of Medicine 2435 
(discussing the reliance on foreign doctors in the US health care system).
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much health care must one have before one’s human rights are being 
violated? 177 In answering this question, the theory faces a problem that 
parallels one we discussed for Nussbaum and Sen – if the threshold is set 
too low, the negative eff ects of medical tourism may not cause a “defi cit” 
to the human right; if the threshold is set too high, then it will cause a 
defi cit, but so will not allowing that tourism to go forward (given the 
needs of the American patients using medical tourism). Pogge has off ered 
a response to a somewhat similar criticism by suggesting the proviso to 
his theory that “these human rights defi cits must be reasonably avoidable 
in the sense that a feasible alternative design of the relevant institutional 
order would not produce comparable human rights defi cits or other ills 
of comparable magnitude.” 178 But, as in our discussion of a somewhat 
similar proviso by Nagel, one might wonder what “reasonably avoidable” 
really means and how much of the institutional order we should feel free 
to redesign in a given moment. Once again, this problem seems least 
acute for insurer-prompted medical tourism and medical tourism for 
services like cosmetic surgery.
Second, Pogge has tried to avoid some of the pragmatic and 
political feasibility problems of the Cosmopolitan theories by trying 
to use a kind of act-omission distinction, with the ideas of “harm” and 
“imposing ... defi cits.” But, as Daniels has remarked, “[i]nternational 
harming is complex in several ways. Th e harms are often not deliberate; 
sometimes benefi ts were arguably intended.” Daniels has also argued 
that “harms are often mixed with benefi ts” such that “great care must 
be taken to describe the baseline in measuring harm,” and the “complex 
story about motivations, intentions, and eff ects might seem to weaken 
the straightforward appeal of” Pogge’s theory. 179 To illustrate: as in 
Pogge’s examples (by hypothesis), the existence of the phenomenon of 
medical tourism leads to a “defi cit” in one human right – health care 
– and one might say that medical tourism is supported by the existing 
177. C.f. Daniels, supra note 39 (asking whether Pogge’s human right to health 
is frustrated “[w]henever a country fails to meet the levels of health 
provided, say, by Japan, which has the highest life expectancy” at 337).
178. Th omas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge, Mass: Polity, 2008) at 26.
179. Daniels, supra note 39 at 340.
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institutional order insofar as that order facilitates things like international 
travel, standard setting, and accreditation of foreign hospitals. But do 
these institutional elements “harm” the human right to health care of 
destination country citizens in our case? 180
In Pogge’s examples, we have identifi able state and international 
actors, chief culprits if you will, at whom he can point the fi nger as actors 
who caused the defi cit in question: the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement, 
and those who support them. 181 For medical tourism, by contrast, we 
180. In discussing Pogge’s proposal to create a prize system to spur innovation 
in drugs targeting the global burden of disease, Daniels critiques whether 
what is going on is really “harming” versus “not optimally helping?” 
Daniels, supra note 39 at 337. A similar worry seems less apposite as to 
medical tourism where it is the actions of home country citizens that are 
setting back the interests of those abroad, assuming arguendo that medical 
tourism makes the Indian poor worse off  than they would otherwise be.
181. Others writing in much the same vein as Pogge on access to essential 
pharmaceuticals in LDCs have emphasized similar facts about this context 
that strain the analogy to medical tourism and suggest the case for Global 
Justice obligations may be much stronger in the pharmaceutical context. 
For example, Outterson and Light, working on an analogy to duties to 
engage in easy rescue when there are special relationships, suggest several 
specifi c reasons why that analogy is applicable in the drug context: the 
fact that “the patent-based drug companies created the global intellectual 
property system and are actively preventing rescue by others” with the 
explicit goal of prohibiting “free trade of low-priced generics from the 
emerging pharmaceutical industries in developing countries” thereby 
having created the danger, the fact that the drug companies receive public 
monies and are able to block development through the patent system, 
and (according to these authors) the fact that that innovation rewards 
could be set up in such a way to make this a case of “easy rescue” wherein 
pharmaceutical companies would not lose much if anything from their 
bottom line. Kevin Outterson & David W Light, “Global Pharmaceutical 
Markets” in Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, eds, A Companion To Bioethics, 
2d ed (Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 417 at 417-29. None of 
these points seems true as to the United States’ or other home countries’ 
involvement in medical tourism by those individuals paying out of 
pocket. Th at said, some elements (such as the use of public funds) are 
more analogous to government-prompted medical tourism, and some 
of these points (pursuit of profi t-maximizing strategies that may run 
counter to destination-country health care access) may in appropriate 
cases provide reasons for subjecting medical tourism intermediaries to 
the same approbation these authors foist on drug companies. Th is latter 
point on corporate social responsibility raises questions beyond the scope 
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have a much more complex web of acts and omissions that together form 
the system. We have the private decisions of individual citizens in the 
home country to satisfy health care needs in a foreign country, which 
seems like causing harm, but that need may be itself caused by a state-
level failure to secure universal health care, or even more indirectly by the 
failure to adopt more redistributive taxation approaches. What about the 
role played by US health insurance companies in pricing their plans that 
in part determines how many Americans are uninsured (which, in turn, 
is partially a function of the wage demands of health care workers)? We 
also have the background international law and trade principles allowing 
for free travel by citizens to foreign states and the consumption of goods 
and services abroad, but are those causes of defi cits? 182 To put the point 
another way, the baseline against which Pogge’s concept of harm is drawn 
is extremely slippery as to medical tourism – a problem that legal realism 
has emphasized in legal discourse. 183
of this article, which is focused on governmental and intergovernmental 
obligations.
182. Larry Gostin has made a similar point as to these kinds of theories more 
generally: “National policies and globalization have benefi ted the rich and 
contributed to global health disparities, but so have many other factors. 
Blame for harms in the Th ird World, however, is hard to assess. States 
usually do not intend to cause harm to poor countries, and political 
leaders may believe they are doing good. International policies, moreover, 
often have mixed benefi ts and harms that defy any simple assignment of 
blame. Finally, countries themselves may have contributed to the harms 
due to inadequate attention to population health, excessive militarization, 
or simple incompetence or corruption. At bottom, reasonable people 
disagree as to who bears the responsibility for health inequalities and who 
owes a duty to right the perceived wrongs.” Gostin, supra note 68 at 345-
46.
183. It is also worth emphasizing that not every “harm” in the sense that Pogge 
uses the term may morally obligate us to compensate the victim. If I open 
up a fl ower shop next door to yours, and my shop siphons off  your best 
fl orists by off ering higher wages that causes a diminution in your business, 
we do not ordinarily think that I have wrongfully harmed you or that I 
owe you recompense for the setback to your interest. Th is is true even if I 
open my shop with the intention of driving you out of business. If this is 
the mechanism by which medical tourism reduces access to health care for 
the destination country poor (one of several of the possible mechanisms I 
sketched above) – that doctors who served the destination country poor 
instead move over to the medical tourism facility to treat their patients 
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All that said, I do not want to overstate the point. Th e subset of 
government-sponsored medical tourism seems to nicely parallel Pogge’s 
own examples: this form of medical tourism has both a clear causal 
pathway of “harm” and easy-to-specify institutional rearrangements, 
such that under Pogge’s view, it should give rise to obligations on home 
countries. How well the theory extends into medical tourism by patients 
purchasing out-of-pocket (or even insurer-prompted medical tourism), 
however, is less clear.
VI. Convergence, Divergence & Policy Prescriptions
In this article, I have tried to tackle head-on the pressing question of 
medical tourism and access to health care abroad. While I hope to have 
made some progress, part of the point has been to show how complex the 
issue is and how, on the philosophical side, it identifi es lacunae and poses 
hard questions for many major theories.
I began by identifying the biggest unknown in the question – what 
eff ect medical tourism is actually having on health care access in the 
destination country – and have sought to assist the empirical project 
of answering that question by specifying several plausible triggering 
conditions through which we would expect medical tourism to reduce 
access to medical services for the poor in the destination country.
Assuming arguendo that the empirical claim that medical tourism 
impairs health care access by the destination country poor in some cases is 
satisfi ed, I then examined the normative question: under what conditions 
would a diminution in health care access by the destination country poor 
due to medical tourism trigger obligations on the part of home countries 
and international bodies? I rejected the simplest argument appealing 
to national self-interest in restricting medical tourism because it is 
implausible. I then examined three broad camps of Global Justice theory 
(Cosmopolitan, Statist, and Intermediate) as grounds for obligations, but 
– it seems that the facility should similarly not owe recompense or 
remediation; if the medical tourism facility does not owe the destination 
country poor for this action, why should the home country whose causal 
role in the harm is still more attenuated? I am indebted to Nir Eyal for 
this suggestion.
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that examination has not pointed in one clear direction. I have expressed 
a preference for the approach of the Intermediate theories because they 
try to off er us a theory of obligations stemming from medical tourism, 
rather than a more general theory of what we owe to those abroad quite 
divorced from medical tourism. In particular, the institutional-focused 
approach of Cohen, Sable, and Daniels seems to me an extremely 
fertile way forward in this area, though I have suggested reasons why 
its actual application to this case study might suggest a more restricted 
set of obligations than that championed by many of the commentators 
(academic and popular) discussed in the introduction.
Taking a step back, what can we say about the larger landscape of 
Global Justice theories, access to health care, and medical tourism? While 
I think a true overlapping consensus or incompletely theorized agreement 
between these diff erent theories eludes us in this area, I do think it is 
fair to say we can identify two “central tendencies” among the group of 
theories: insurer-prompted medical tourism and government-prompted 
medical tourism are the areas where the argument that states and 
international bodies have a moral obligation to intervene is the strongest, 
for two diff erent (but on some theories also overlapping) reasons. Th e 
case for curbing insurer-prompted medical tourism is stronger because 
preventing these services is less likely to expose the state’s own citizens to 
defi cits in health care access, 184 which would be in tension with the same 
concerns regarding those abroad. Similar reasoning suggests that there 
is a greater obligation to restrict medical tourism for inessential services 
or services that are more penumbral to the concept of health (such as 
cosmetic surgery and, on some accounts, fertility tourism). Th e case for 
intervening in government-prompted medical tourism is stronger because 
there is a fairly direct causal tie between the state’s action and the defi cits 
caused by medical tourism (which matter on the intermediate theories). 
Claims of an obligation on the part of the home country government or 
international bodies to do something about medical tourism by those 
184. To be sure, as I cautioned above, even restricting insurer-prompted 
medical tourism poses some risk of diminution in access domestically; 
it is just that it appears to pose less of that risk such that the case for 
intervention is concomitantly stronger.
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purchasing essential services out-of-pocket seem concomitantly weaker.
Beyond these central tendencies, however, there is a fair amount 
of divergence among the theories in picking out which circumstances 
give rise to obligations (e.g., only medical tourism to “burdened states”? 
Only medical tourism to states whose method of ratifying GATS seems 
suspect?) and whether there are limits on the means by which those 
obligations can be met (only foreign aid, targeted or otherwise, or more 
paternalistic attempts to control the fl ow of home countries’ patients as 
well?). Th e Nagelian conception of humanitarian aid might be thought 
of as a fl oor on which these other theories can add, but, as I have shown 
above, its demands are somewhat independent of medical tourism and 
instead stem from the existence of desperate need, regardless of its causal 
relation to medical tourism.
In any event, my ambition here has been to lay out the terrain of 
Global Justice theories, their application to medical tourism, and the 
problems that arise from that application. 185 Going further and deciding 
the exact content of those obligations requires choosing between these 
rival theories and fi lling many of the lacunae I have identifi ed in their 
application. Although I have made some tentative suggestions here and 
there, I have not attempted that task in this paper. Instead, my goal has 
been to open a dialogue between moral and political theorists and those 
making on-the-ground policy prescriptions relating to medical tourism’s 
negative eff ects on the health of the poor in the destination country.
My own tentative conclusion is that there is a more persuasive case 
for restricting insurer-and government-prompted medical tourism, and 
medical tourism for services that are inessential or more in the penumbra 
of “health.” By contrast, due to concerns about health care access in the 
home country, I fi nd less convincing the case for restricting medical 
tourism for those purchasing essential health services out-of-pocket, 
especially when this represents these individuals’ best way of getting these 
services.186  
185. While my own theoretical preferences lean towards the Cohen, Sable, and 
Daniels approach as the most useful approach in this area, I have tried to 
maintain a relatively Catholic attitude towards the diff erent contenders so 
as to pave the way for those more drawn to one of the rival accounts.
186. One lingering concern with that conclusion is that it seems to “reward” 
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Interestingly, that ordering mirrors my conclusions on the policy 
side as to the ease by which home states can implement policies to curb 
medical tourism of diff erent varieties, as I have suggested in other work 
on medical tourism. 187
For government-prompted medical tourism, the United States could, 
by regulation or legislation, restrict facilities or countries to which it 
sends patients to those with health care access guarantees or amelioration 
plans. It could also leave the market unregulated but dedicate foreign 
aid to destination countries based on the volume of medical tourism 
to particular regions. Of course, in so doing, it would have to rely on 
foreign sovereigns to spend aid appropriately or devise a system whereby 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are given the aid or monitor its 
spending. As long as such policies did not result in signifi cantly longer 
waiting times or fewer procedures covered, the eff ect on health care access 
for the US poor would be small.
For insurer-prompted medical tourism, the United States could by 
state or federal insurance regulation prevent sending patients to facilities 
or countries without health access amelioration plans. 188 Th e United 
the “bad” countries that have not secured universal health care in their 
home state, and thus have given more of their domestic poor the incentive 
to go abroad. Of course, it is beyond cavil that countries like the United 
States that have failed to secure truly universal health care have not failed 
to do so in order to be able to send their poor abroad for medical tourism 
without acting unjustly, but that does not seem an adequate response. 
Here are two that may be more (if not entirely) satisfying. First of all, to 
repeat something I said earlier, supra note 135, in a world of ideal justice, 
the United States would have achieved universal health care, but we are 
faced with a very diff erent world and are asking what obligations we can 
realistically impose upon it under the circumstances. Second, while we 
may be “rewarding” the “bad” states, we also want to avoid “punishing” 
their poor citizens who lack better options than medical tourism.
187. See Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1506-17, 1544-46. 
For a more in-depth discussion of the tools and drawbacks for regulating 
medical tourism, including extensive discussion of home country, 
destination country, and multilateral possibilities for regulations, see 
I Glenn Cohen, “How To Regulate Medical Tourism” [unpublished, 
archived at Virginia Journal of International Law Association] [Cohen, 
“How to Regulate”].
188. C.f. ibid at 1544-46. But see supra note 51 and sources cited therein 
for skepticism as to how well such regulation is actually enforced in a 
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States could also (in addition or separately) tax insurers by their volume 
of medical tourism and redistribute those sums towards health care access 
amelioration in the destination country. Th is would mirror to some 
extent the UNITAID scheme; UNITAID is an NGO aimed at scaling up 
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, primarily 
for people in low-income countries. A large share of its funding (72 
percent) stems from twenty-nine supporting countries (including France 
and Chile) that have voluntarily chosen to impose on airlines departing 
from their countries a tax on departing passenger tickets collected by the 
airlines set by the country – for example, France imposes a €1 and €10 tax 
on domestic economy, and a €4 and €40 tax on departing international 
fl ights, respectively.189 On e might also think about this in analogy to the 
use of taxes on tobacco products to off set some of the costs those products 
impose on the health care system.
It is much harder to regulate the behavior of US medical tourists 
paying out-of-pocket. Even here, though, we do have some options. Th e 
United States could hypothetically render illegal some forms of medical 
tourism (compare the PROTECT Act, making it a crime to engage in 
child sex while abroad), or render less attractive some forms of medical 
tourism (for example, by exempting them from the tax deduction 
available for qualifying medical expenses), but as I have said before, I 
worry that these regulatory interventions are either too draconian or 
not terribly eff ective.190 Th  e United States could also tax intermediaries 
and use the revenue to support health care access in LDCs (in a way 
similar to that discussed above) or try to force JCI to build health care 
access into accreditation standards. Less paternalistically, the United 
States or international bodies could create a separate third-party labeling 
or accreditation standard that audits facilities and informs tourists of 
how attentive a facility is to health care access concerns regarding the 
local population, as Nir Eyal has proposed under the moniker “Global 
Health Impact Labels” in analogy to Fairtrade Coff ee.191 I  have some 
destination country such as India.
189. About UNITAID online: UNITAID <http://www.unitaid.eu>.
190. Cohen, “Protecting Patients”, supra note 14 at 1511-15.
191. Nir Eyal, “Global Health Impact Labels” in Ezekiel Emanuel & Joseph 
Millum, eds, Global Justice in Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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doubts about how eff ective these labels are likely to be, since medical 
tourism patients are likely to choose facilities based on quite diff erent and 
much more important priorities (for example, location of service, quality 
of doctor, and price) than coff ee drinkers, though to be fair, this is an 
empirical question. Finally, foreign aid is always a possibility.
Th ese are, for the most part, unilateral strategies focused on what 
steps medical tourist patients’ home states could take. Destination 
country and multilateral strategies are also possible, but for reasons I have 
discussed in greater depth elsewhere, these seem less feasible.192
Destination country governments can tax medical tourism providers 
and redistribute the proceeds to pay for health care access for the poor, 
regulate the behavior of their physicians and impose requirements 
that they spend certain amounts of their time serving domestic rather 
than foreign patients, require a uniform reimbursement rate or limit 
the disparities, etc. In destination countries where certifi cates or other 
licensure is required in order to build a new hospital or expand an 
existing one, the government can limit the number of entrants into the 
medical tourism market that exist or extract commitments (such as those 
pertaining to providing care for indigents) from the facilities. Th ere are 
many other possible interventions, and the exact details will vary country 
by country, depending on their existing domestic health care regulation.
However, to the extent medical tourism off ers an infl ux of 
foreign capital to the destination country and its costs occur mostly 
to the destination country poor (many of whom may be somewhat 
disenfranchised in the political system), there is a clear confl ict of 
interests between those who regulate and those who are burdened by 
medical tourism. Even when these regulations are formally put in place, 
there is no guarantee destination country governments will enforce them 
or that the regulations will be much more than a paper tiger, as several 
commentators have suggested regarding medical tourism in India.193
2012) 241.
192. Cohen, “How to Regulate”, supra note 187.
193. See e.g. Johnston et al, supra note 37 at 1; Gupta, supra note 37; see 
also Chinai & Goswami, supra note 49 (discussing the Confederation 
of Indian Industry certifi cation system for medical tourist facilities that 
requires hospitals “to limit the charges to foreigners as part of a dual 
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Turning to the multilateral approach, we have thus far not seen 
multilateral trade agreements pertaining to trade in health services, even 
in the places where such agreements would seem most natural. While 
the United States has pushed for more harmonization of the health care 
systems covered by the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), those 
calls have thus far been resisted by Canada and Mexico.194 Wh ile the 
European Union has the most comprehensive regulatory regime for 
trading health services in the world – requiring inter alia national health 
insurance systems in member states to cover treatments in other member 
states, and mutual recognition of the credentials of doctors, nurses, and 
pharmacists – the World Health Organization (WHO) has concluded 
that “there has been little progress in developing a common regulatory 
framework for health services or in establishing common standards of 
training and practice,” and stated that “[r]egulation of professional practice 
in health care remains very diff erent across the member countries.”195
Although it is in theory possible for the WHO to make rules 
governing medical tourism through the powers granted to it by the 
International Health Regulations, I share with others skepticism that this 
is a likely way forward – importantly, it would mean straying a fair amount 
from the International Health Regulations’ origins and its purpose, the 
prevention of disease migration. 196 Similarly, the multiple references to 
a human right to health in the UN Charter, International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, WHO constitution, and 
elsewhere have thus far resulted in remarkably little international health 
care regulation, 197 and given the various powerful pro-medical tourism 
pricing system that off ers domestic patients lower prices,” but noting that 
“even these lower prices are too high for the vast majority of India’s 1.1 
billion population” at 164-65).
194. Nathan Cortez, “Patients Without Borders: Th e Emerging Global Market 
for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care” (2008) 83:1 Ind 
LJ 71 at 128.
195. Ibid, quoting Rupa Chanda, “Trade in Health Services”, WHO 
Communication on Macroeconomics and Health, (2001) Working Paper 
Series, 1, 73, Paper No WG 4:5.
196. See Gostin, supra note 68 at 375-81.
197. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), 
UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948) 71; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights, 16 
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constituencies, regulation restraining the medical tourism industry seems 
unlikely as a starting place for such an approach. Gostin has proposed 
a Framework Convention on Global Health, of which medical tourism 
could certainly play a part, but as he recognizes, there are formidable 
obstacles to achieving this goal, such that middle-or short-term action of 
this sort seems unlikely. 198
VII. Conclusion: From Medical Tourism to Health  
 Care Globalization
A number of authors in both the popular and academic literature have 
expressed concern about the eff ects of medical tourism on access to 
health care for the poor of the destination country and have claimed that 
this is a normative problem calling for regulatory intervention. In this 
article, I have broken down this claim into its empirical and normative 
components and put pressure on both. On the empirical side, I have 
noted the current absence of evidence for diminutions in health care 
access by the destination country poor due to medical tourism, and 
tried to specify triggering conditions that could be further studied by 
developmental economists under which this diminution would be 
most likely. Assuming arguendo that such negative eff ects occur, I then 
examined the normative question of destination country governments 
and international bodies’ obligations as to medical tourism having such 
eff ect. I canvassed Cosmopolitan, Statist, and Intermediate theories, and 
suggested ways in which application of these theories to medical tourism 
highlights gaps and indeterminacies, as well as reasons why some of these 
theories may not be good fi ts for this kind of applied ethics inquiry, 
and built on existing discussions of pharmaceutical pricing and medical 
migration. I have tried to map divergences and convergences between 
these theories, and tentatively conclude that the claim for Global Justice 
obligations stemming from medical tourism is strongest (but not without 
problems) for insurer-and government-prompted medical tourism and 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 302, S Exec Doc D 95-2 1978; Constitution 
of the World Health Organization preamble, 22 July 1946, 14 UNTS 185, 
art 1, 62 Stat 2679; Gostin, supra note 68 at 381.
198.  Gostin, supra note 68 at 383-91.
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for tourism for inessential services, such as cosmetic surgeries, while it 
is quite weak for medical tourism by those paying out-of-pocket for 
essential services. Finally, I have outlined the types of regulatory policy 
levers available to developed countries and international bodies to seek to 
remedy defi cits in destination country health care access due to medical 
tourism.
While my focus has been on medical tourism, as I suggested above, 
I think the discussion here has some important implications for analysis 
of other manifestations of the globalization of health care, and indeed, 
perhaps, for globalization more generally. Here are six tentative lessons 
I think the work I have done in this article might teach us in shaping 
future analyses.
First, at the highest level, while it is somewhat philosophically 
“impure,” I think the method of analysis provided here is useful, especially 
for work aimed at policymakers. Th e empirical and normative approaches 
are jointly necessary in establishing the need for action. More subtly, 
within the normative sphere, it is useful to consider both more and less 
demanding theories of Global Justice and to map their convergences and 
divergences; even if one thinks some of these theories are “too stingy” 
or “get it wrong,” they are useful for persuading policymakers and other 
audiences that one need not be a full-blown Cosmopolitan (with all the 
implications that would mean) in order to justify some actions. Th us, 
in medical migration (the medical brain drain), it is helpful to show, 
for example, that even on the narrower Statist approaches, the duty to 
aid burdened states may establish obligations to engage in institution-
building so as to educate providers and increase capacities; on the Cohen, 
Sabel, and Daniels Intermediate approach, the existence of rulemaking 
bodies with some claim of dominion over the fi eld (the ILO, according 
to Daniels) and the international interdependence fostered by push 
and pull factors may ground the need for action; and on the Poggean 
approach, the more that migration is thought of as the unjust “taking” 
of doctors, the more easily obligations to avoid or mitigate that activity 
can be understood as fl owing from an obligation to avoid “harming” a 
“human right” to health.
Second, I think that the national self-interest arguments for 
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Western governments intervening in medical tourism are also weak in 
other instances of health care globalization. For example, I think such 
arguments suff er similar defi cits as to medical migration. To adapt 
those arguments: even assuming dubitante that patients in the country 
where migrating doctors go (the “receiving country”) suff er indirectly 
because these new physicians provide lower quality care – or there is 
an increase in disease transmission to the receiving countries because 
of the depletion of providers in the sending country (the country from 
which the doctors migrate), or the sending country’s citizens are less able 
to purchase our goods due to their poorer health caused by migration, 
or migration increases immigration pressure from sending countries or 
national security threats to receiving countries – these negative eff ects 
are likely outweighed by the self-interested benefi ts of migration for the 
receiving country. Th us, just as with medical tourism, it seems as though 
we will need some form of Global Justice theory to ground obligations 
to intervene.
Th ird, the cleavage I have introduced between types of Global 
Justice theories has broader application to other instances of health 
care globalization and globalization more generally. Th e Cosmopolitan 
theories and the duty of humanitarian aid under Statist theories do not 
off er us a theory of when we are responsible for harms stemming from 
medical tourism, medical migration, or other forms of globalization, but 
instead a theory of when we ought to improve the lives of the badly-off  
simpliciter. Let me illustrate with medical migration. Again, in one sense, 
causation matters: only if restricting migration causes an improvement 
in the well-being of those in the sending country (up to a capability 
threshold, up to the threshold of humanitarian needs, or in the interest 
of increasing welfare, depending on the theory) are we required to take 
the action. In another sense, however, causation in the historical and 
responsibility senses is irrelevant because it is the mere fact of the other 
country’s citizens’ needs that imposes upon us the obligation to help them 
in whatever way we can, and not anything about migration and its eff ects 
specifi cally. Th us, in one direction, the duties may persist even when 
migration is halted or its harms are remedied in that the source of the 
obligation is not anything we have done, but instead the destitute state of 
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those abroad. In the other direction, once the theories’ goals are met, we 
do not bear an obligation (at least under distributive justice principles) to 
prevent migration or remedy its ill eff ects, even if migration continues to 
produce signifi cant health care defi cits for the destination country poor 
that would not occur if it were curbed. Moreover, it is possible that other 
forms of aid or assistance might “cancel out” whatever negative eff ects 
migration has in terms of the global Cosmopolitan calculus.
In eff ect, these theories tell us to help those in the sending country 
who are badly-off  by curbing or mitigating the eff ects of medical 
migration, regardless of whether that migration caused them to be badly 
off ; this is to be contrasted with a diff erent group of theories (such as 
several variants of the Intermediate approach) that would urge us to curb 
medical migration because it causes people in the sending country to 
become worse off . Th is distinction does not make the latter group of 
theories “better” than the former, but it does suggest they may be better 
suited at answering questions about the Global Justice implications of 
a particular manifestation of globalization (such as medical tourism or 
migration) as opposed to questions of redistribution between nations at 
the highest level of generality.
Fourth, my analysis here draws attention to the “self-infl icted 
wounds” problem that is endemic in attempts to address Global Justice 
concerns regarding negative impacts of globalization as well as ways to 
deal very directly with this concern. Again, to use medical migration as an 
example, there are ways in which some sending countries might increase 
the supply of health care providers to mitigate migration’s negative eff ects 
but do not do so because of the lobbying eff orts of members of the 
profession seeking to protect their wages by reducing supply. Moreover, 
there are ways in which some of these sending countries might implement 
programs that help them retain more providers in the face of the pull 
of recruiting countries, not only by improving employment conditions 
(easy to recommend, hard to implement), but through mechanisms like 
conditional scholarships that require a number of years of in-country 
service as a condition for forgiving student loans for medical school. 199 
199. See e.g. Delanyo Dovlo & Frank Nyonator, “Migration by Graduates of 
the University of Ghana Medical School: A Preliminary Rapid Appraisal” 
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Especially on the Intermediate theories of Global Justice, the fact that 
a sending country in principle has these interventions available but in 
practice does not use them ought not to completely immunize receiving 
countries from Global Justice obligations, but it should also not be 
completely ignored in the calculus. Rather, we ought to try to factor out 
the elements of the sending country’s population health defi cits caused 
by medical migration that are a result of the domestic policy decisions 
and then apply the obligations of Global Justice to only the remainder 
of defi cits.
As to one more specifi c variant of the “self-infl icted wounds” problem 
relating to obligations to open up one’s service sector to medical tourism 
undertaken as a GATS signatory, I have off ered an analysis that could 
equally be employed as to other kinds of treaty obligations relating to 
trade – a recurring problem as to Global Justice analysis of globalization. 
To the extent the obligations under these treaties span generations and are 
eff ectively compulsory due to their penalties for defection or exit, I have 
suggested that they might count as self-infl icted wounds reducing other 
countries’ Global Justice obligations only insofar as these treaties meet 
heightened requirements for democratic legitimacy such as referenda 
rather than the standards of ordinary legislation.
Fifth, the analysis here has emphasized that medical tourism 
is a heterogeneous practice and that its diff erent constituent forms 
(government-prompted, insurer-prompted, out-of-pocket, etc.) may 
lead to diff erent Global Justice analyses. I have also suggested we need 
to pay careful attention to who benefi ts in the home country from 
medical tourism, and their counterfactual care and welfare if the practice 
is stymied. Th e same seems true as to other manifestations of health 
care globalization. Again, let me use medical migration to illustrate. Just 
as I have suggested that there is a greater obligation to restrict medical 
tourism for inessential services or services that are more penumbral to the 
concept of health (such as cosmetic surgery), it seems to me that medical 
(1999) 3:1 Human Resources For Health Development Journal 40; Nir 
Eyal & Till Bärnighausen, “Conditioning Medical Scholarships on Long, 
Future Service: A Defense” [unpublished, archived at Virginia Journal of 
International Law Association].
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migration is most problematic when it would recruit sending country 
physicians to provide services that are inessential or penumbral to health 
in the receiving country. Th is might, for example, serve as a basis for 
limiting the recruiting of less developed sending country physicians for 
US (or Canadian or other) cosmetic surgery (or other) medical residency 
programs, but not residencies in other specialties. It might also lead us to 
allow recruiting of foreign physicians only for underserved areas in the 
receiving country and not more generally.
I have also argued that the case for intervening in government-
prompted medical tourism is stronger because there is a fairly direct causal 
tie between the state’s action and the defi cits caused by medical tourism 
(which matter on the Intermediate theories). Similarly, there may be a 
stronger argument for intervention in medical migration in cases where a 
receiving country’s governmental health care system – such as the National 
Health Service (NHS) in Britain, or the individual provinces in Canada 
– are the ones directly recruiting physicians from places like Ghana, as 
opposed to cases involving recruitment by individual private hospitals. 200 
To be sure, there are many ways in which this analogy is inexact. Unlike 
individual patients traveling abroad for health care, with hospitals 
recruiting foreign physicians, we are still dealing with institutions, and 
thus the Intermediate theories are better-poised to impose duties upon 
them. Moreover, since governmental health care systems tend to achieve 
better domestic distributive justice by ensuring universal coverage, there 
may be something worrying about penalizing them in terms of Global 
Justice in the analysis as compared to more privatized systems, although 
perhaps not if that universal coverage is attained through improper 
200. Th e Canadian provinces are single-payers, but the doctors are individual 
contractors, not employees of the provinces, and hospitals may be publicly 
or privately owned. In the British National Health Service, by contrast, 
physicians in general practice are capitated employees, while specialty 
physicians are salaried employees of the National Health Service (NHS), 
and hospitals are primarily publicly owned. See e.g. Deborah J Chollett, 
“Health Financing in Selected Industrialized Nations: Comparative 
Analysis and Comment” excerpted in Mark A Hall et al, Health Care Law 
and Ethics, 7th ed (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2007). I leave it to other 
work to consider whether these diff erences between the two systems may 
be relevant in the analysis.
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physician recruitment from less developed countries.
Again, I do not aim for what I have said here to provide a fi nal analysis 
of Global Justice issues in medical migration, let alone other forms of 
health care globalization or globalization more generally. Instead, I have 
aimed to show how my analysis of these issues in regards to medical 
tourism helps us identify the right questions to ask as to the larger fi eld 
of health care globalization, and perhaps globalization generally.

